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InfoTelesys Lawsuit: K. COMMON AUTHORITIES

Constitution for the United States of America

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Article. I.

Section. 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section. 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof , for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies .

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section. 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December , unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Section. 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section. 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section. 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section. 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings; — And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section. 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Section. 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Article. II.

Section. 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:

Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President .

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected .

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Section. 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section. 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Section. 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

Article. III.

Section. 1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section. 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; — to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; — to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; — to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; — to Controversies between two or more States; — between a State and Citizens of another State ; — between Citizens of different States; — between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section. 3. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

Article. IV.

Section. 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Section. 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due .

Section. 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.

Article. V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate .

Article. VI.

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

Article. VII.

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

The Word, "the," being interlined between the seventh and eighth Lines of the first Page, The Word "Thirty" being partly written on an Erazure in the fifteenth Line of the first Page, The Words "is tried" being interlined between the thirty second and thirty third Lines of the first Page and the Word "the" being interlined between the forty third and forty fourth Lines of the second Page.

Attest William Jackson
Secretary

done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

Go. WASHINGTON — Presidt.
and deputy from Virginia

New Hampshire {

JOHN LANGDON
NICHOLAS GILMAN

Massachusetts {

NATHANIEL GORHAM
RUFUS KING

Connecticut {

WM. SAML. JOHNSON
ROGER SHERMAN

New York . . . .

ALEXANDER HAMILTON

New Jersey {

WIL: LIVINGSTON
DAVID BREARLEY.
WM. PATERSON.
JONA: DAYTON

Pennsylvania {

B FRANKLIN
THOMAS MIFFLIN
ROBT MORRIS
GEO. CLYMER
THOS. FITZ SIMONS
JARED INGERSOLL
JAMES WILSON
GOUV MORRIS

Delaware {

GEO: READ
GUNNING BEDFORD jun
JOHN DICKINSON
RICHARD BASSETT
JACO: BROOM

Maryland {

JAMES MCHENRY
DAN OF ST THOS. JENIFER
DANL CARROLL

Virginia {

JOHN BLAIR
JAMES MADISON jr

North Carolina {

WM. BLOUNT
RICHD. DOBBS SPAIGHT
HU WILLIAMSON

South Carolina {

J. RUTLEDGE
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY
CHARLES PINCKNEY
PIERCE BUTLER

Georgia {

WILLIAM FEW
ABR BALDWIN

In Convention Monday, September 17th, 1787.

Present

The States of

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, MR. Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.

Resolved,

That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States in Congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be appointed by the States which have ratified the same, and a Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the President, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings under this Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected: That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Senators and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the Senate, for the sole purpose of receiving, opening and counting the Votes for President; and, that after he shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this Constitution.

By the Unanimous Order of the Convention

Go. WASHINGTON — President.
W. JACKSON Secretary.


U.S. Constitution Bill of Rights

Congress OF THE United States begun and held at the City of New-York, on Wednesday the Fourth of March, one thousand seven hundred and eighty nine. THE Conventions of a number of the States having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government, will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of both Houses concurring, that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States, as Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all or any of which Articles, when ratified by three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution; viz.: ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original Constitution.

Article the first [Not Ratified]

After the first enumeration required by the first Article of the Constitution, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Representative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative for every fifty thousand persons.

Article the second [Amendment XXVII - Ratified 1992]

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

Article the third [Amendment I]

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Article the fourth [Amendment II]

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

Article the fifth [Amendment III]

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Article the sixth [Amendment IV]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article the seventh [Amendment V]

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Article the eighth [Amendment VI]

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Article the ninth [Amendment VII]

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Article the tenth [Amendment VIII]

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Article the eleventh [Amendment IX]

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Article the twelfth [Amendment X]

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

 

ATTEST: Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, Speaker of the House of Representatives


[Article. XI.] [Amendment XI]
[Proposed 1794; Ratified 1798]
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

[Article. XII.] [Amendment XI]
[Proposed 1803; Ratified 1804]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; — The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; — The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. — The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

Article XII [Amendment XIII-I]
[Proposed 1810; Ratified 1819]
If any Citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any Title of Nobility or Honour, or shall, without the Consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, Pension, Office or Emolument of any kind whatever, from any Emperor, King, Prince or foreign Power, such Person shall cease to be a Citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any Office of Trust or Profit under them, or either of them.


NOTE: Following the British invasion and burning of the White House and the unlawful Civil War, there is question as to whether any Amendments to the Constitution are lawful.


Article XIII. [Proposed 1861; Endorsed by Lincoln while president-elect; Unratified [1]
No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

Article. XIII. [Amendment XIII-II]
[Proposed 1865; Ratified 1865]
Section. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

Section. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Article. XIV. [Unratified Amendment XIV]
[Proposed 1866; Allegedly ratified 1868. See Fourteenth Amendment Law Library for argument proving it was not ratified.]
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

Section. 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Section. 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Article. XV. [Amendment XV]
[Proposed 1869; Ratified 1870]
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Article. XVI. [Unratified Amendment XVI]
[Proposed 1909; Unratified - Secretary of State Knox fraudulently claimed ratification in 1913]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.

[Article. XVII.]
[Proposed 1912; Ratified 1913; Possibly Unconstitutional (See Article V, Clause 3 of the Constitution)]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

Article. [XVIII.]
[Proposed 1917; Ratified 1919; Repealed 1933 (See Amendment XXI, Section 1
Section. 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.

Section. 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Article. [XIX.]
[Proposed 1919; Ratified 1920]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

[Unratified Article.]
[Proposed 1926; Unratified]
Article —

Section. 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.

Section. 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except that the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress.

Article. [XX.]
[Proposed 1932; Ratified 1933]
Section. 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.

Section. 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section. 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.

Section. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.

Section. 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.

Section. 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

Article. [XXI.]
[Proposed 1933; Ratified 1933]
Section. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

Section. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.

Article. [XXII.]
[Proposed 1947; Ratified 1951]
Section. 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

Section. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.

Article. [XXIII.]
[Proposed 1960; Ratified 1961]
Section. 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Article. [XXIV.]
[Proposed 1962; Ratified 1964]
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Article. [XXV.]
[Proposed 1965; Ratified 1967]
Section. 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.

Section. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Section. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.

Section. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.

Article. [XXVI.]
[Proposed 1971; Ratified 1971]
Section. 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

[Inoperative Article.]
[Proposed 1972; Expired Unratified 1982]
Article —

Section. 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.

Section. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

Section. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.

[Inoperative Article.]
[Proposed 1978; Expired Unratified 1985]
Article —

Section. 1. For purposes of representation in the Congress, election of the President and Vice President, and article V of this Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall be treated as though it were a State.

Section. 2. The exercise of the rights and powers conferred under this article shall be by the people of the District constituting the seat of government, and as shall be provided by the Congress.

Section. 3. The twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.

Section. 4. This article shall be inoperative, unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

Article. [XXVII.]
[Proposed 1789; Ratified 1992; Second of twelve Articles comprising the Bill of Rights]
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT APPLY

Time limitation does not apply where the judgment is based on a fraudulent return. (Washko v. Stewart, supra, p. 318; Richert v. Benson Lbr. Co., supra, p. 677.).

Statutory Limitations go out the window in malicious prosecution cases:  “Duty of a trial court to afford every DEFENDANT a fair and impartial trial is of constitutional dimension; where the procedure has fallen short of that standard, an accused has been denied due process and the inherent power of the court to correct matters by granting a new trial transcends statutory limitations.  People v. Oliver, 120 Cal.Rptr. 368, 46 C.A.3d 747. 

“A void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally,”  People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994). 

MISPRISION OF FELONY

Title 18 U.S.C. § 4. MISPRISION OF FELONY. “Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.”

Title 18 U.S.C.A. 242 (U.S. Criminal Code) "Whoever, under color of law, statute, or ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitants of any state to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or Law of the United States. . . shall be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned one year or both."

Title 18 U.S.C.A. 241, 242 are the criminal equivalent of Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983, 1985 et seq. "Judges have no immunity from prosecution for their judicial acts."  - BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)

"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice."  - PIERSON V. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)

EVERY PERSON LIABLE FOR CRIMES UNDER COLOR OF LAW

Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE CONSPIRATORS N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988:

UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983

PROCEEDINGS OUTSIDE OF COURT AUTHORITY ARE VOID

"But proceedings outside the authority of the court, or in violation or contravention of statutory prohibitions, are, whether the court have jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the action or proceedings, or not, utterly void." - Sache v. Wallace, 101 Minn. 169, 112 N.W. 386 (1907)

PARENT CAN SUE FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS

Either parent can sue for interference with parental rights:

STRODE V. GLEASON, 510 P.2d 250 (1973);

FEDERAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION ON DIVORCE CLAIMS

Federal Courts can rule on federal claims (constitutional questions) involved in state divorce cases and award money damages for federal torts or in diversity of citizenship cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress by denial of parental rights, "visitation", as long as the Federal Court is not asked to modify custodial status:

LLOYD V. LOEFFLER, 518 F.Supp 720 (custodial father won $95,000 against parental kidnapping wife)

FENSLAGE V. DAWKINS, 629 F.2d 1107 ($130,000 damages for parental kidnapping)

KAJTAZI V. KAJTAZI, 488 F.Supp 15 (1976)

SPINDEL V. SPINDEL, 283 F.Supp. 797 (1969)

HOWARD V. KUNEN, USDC Mass CA No. 73-3813-G, 12/3/73 (unreported)

SCHWAB V. HUTSON, USDC, S.Dist. MI, 11/70 (unreported)

LORBEER V. THOMPSON, USDC Colorado (1981)

CUSTODY MAY BE CHANGED IF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ABRIDGED

Custody can be changed if visitation is denied.

Wife can be held in contempt if visitation is denied.

ENTWISTLE V. ENTWISTLE, 402 NYS 2d 213

 

Custody can be changed if wife is "disrespectful" of "visitation" order:

MURASKIN V. MURASKIN 283 NW 2d 140 (N. Dakota 1979)

 

U.S.C. SECTION 1738A AND 42 AND  654, 663

The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (28 U.S.C. Section 1738A and 42

U.S.C. Section 654, 663) is a federal statute enacted in 1980 to address kidnapping by noncustodial parents and inconsistent child custody decisions made by state courts. The law provides for penalties for kidnapping and requires states to recognize and enforce the custody decisions of courts in other states, rather than make a second, and possibly inconsistent, decision.

CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE KIDNAP

278.  Every person, not having a right to custody, who maliciously takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals any child with the intent to detain or conceal that child from a lawful custodian shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.

 

278.5.  (a) Every person who takes, entices away, keeps, withholds, or conceals a child and maliciously deprives a lawful custodian of a right to custody, or a person of a right to visitation, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both that fine and imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years, a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both that fine and imprisonment.

   (b) Nothing contained in this section limits the court's contempt power.

   (c) A custody order obtained after the taking, enticing away, keeping, withholding, or concealing of a child does not constitute a defense to a crime charged under this section.

 

280.  Every person who willfully causes or permits the removal or concealment of any child in violation of Section 8713, 8803, or 8910 of the Family Code shall be punished as follows:

   (a) By imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year if the child is concealed within the county in which the adoption proceeding is pending or in which the child has been placed for adoption, or is removed from that county to a place within this state.

   (b) By imprisonment in the state prison, or by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, if the child is removed from that county to a place outside of this state.

 

§ 44 Aggravated Kidnapping

Aggravated kidnapping is the doing of any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim, or some other person, to give up anything of apparent or prospective value, or to grant any advantage or immunity, in order to secure the release of the person under the offender’s actual or apparent control:

(1)       the forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to another; or

(2)       the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to another; or

(3)       the imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person.

A FELONY

 

§ 44.1 Second degree kidnapping

A.        Second degree kidnapping is the doing of any of the acts listed in Subsection B wherein the victim is:

(1)       used as a hostage or shield;

(2)       used to facilitate the commission of a felony or the flight after an attempt to commit or the commission or a felony;

 (4)      imprisoned or kidnapped for 72 or more hours, except as provided by RS 14:45 (A) (4) or (5); or

(5)       imprisoned or kidnapped when the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon or leads the victim to reasonably believe he is armed with a dangerous weapon.

B.        for the purposes of this section, Kidnapping is:

(1)       the forcible seizing and carrying or any person from one place to another; or

(2)       the enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to another; or

(3)       the imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person

A FELONY

 

§ 45 Simple Kidnapping

A.        Simple kidnapping is:

(1)       the intentional and forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to another without his consent.

(2)       The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, for an unlawful purpose, of any child not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without the consent of his parent or the person charged with its custody.

(3)       The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away, without the consent of the proper authority, or any person who has been lawfully committed to an orphan, insane, feeble-minded or other similar institution.

(4)       The intentional taking, enticing or decoying away and removing from the state, by any parent of his or her child, from the custody of any person to whom custody has been awarded by any court of competent jurisdiction of any state, without the consent of the legal custodian, with intent to defeat the jurisdiction of the said court over the custody of the child.

(5)       the taking, enticing or decoying away and removing from the state, by any person, other than the parent, of a child temporarily placed in his custody by any court of competent jurisdiction in the state, with the intention to defeat the jurisdiction of said court over the custody of the child. A FELONY

 

§ 46 False imprisonment

False imprisonment is the intentional confinement or detention of another, without his consent and without proper legal authority. A MISDEMEANOR

FEDERAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY MATTERS

Federal judges can set aside or overturn state courts to preserve constitutional rights:

MITCHUM V. FOSTER, 407 US 225 (1972)

Title 28 US Code sec. 2284.

 

Federal Courts can rule on federal claims (constitutional questions) involved in state divorce cases and award money damages for federal torts or in diversity of citizenship cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress by denial of parental rights, "visitation", as long as the Federal Court is not asked to modify custodial status:

LLOYD V. LOEFFLER, 518 F.Supp 720 (custodial father won $95,000 against parental kidnapping wife)

FENSLAGE V. DAWKINS, 629 F.2d 1107 ($130,000 damages for parental kidnapping)

KAJTAZI V. KAJTAZI, 488 F.Supp 15 (1976)

SPINDEL V. SPINDEL, 283 F.Supp. 797 (1969)

HOWARD V. KUNEN, USDC Mass CA No. 73-3813-G, 12/3/73 (unreported)

SCHWAB V. HUTSON, USDC, S.Dist. MI, 11/70 (unreported)

LORBEER V. THOMPSON, USDC Colorado (1981)

 

Right of parents to the care, custody and to nurture their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principals of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, AND SUCH RIGHT IS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT PROTECTED BY THIS AMENDMENT AND AMENDMENTS 5, 9, and 14:

DOE V. IRWIN, 441 f. SUPP. 1247, U.S. DISTRICT COURT OF MICHIGAN (1977)

 

Parents have fundamental constitutionally protected interest in continuity of legal bond with their children:

MATTER OF DELANEY, 617 P.2d 886, Oklahoma (1980)

 

The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right:

MAV V. ANDERSON, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843 (1952)

 

"No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child.":

CARSEN V. ELROD, 411 F.Supp. 645, 649 (U.S. District Court Eastern Dist. Virginia 1976)

 

"A parent's right to the preservation of his relationship with his child derives from the fact that the parent's achievement of a rich and rewarding life is likely to depend significantly on his ability to participate in the rearing of his children. A child's corresponding right to protection from interference in the relationship deprives form the psychic importance to him of being raised by a loving, responsible, reliable adult." - FRANZ V. UNITED STATES, 707 F.2d 582, 595-599 (U.S. Ct. App. D.C. Circuit 1983)

 

Loss of First Amendment Freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Though First Amendment rights are not absolute, they may be curtailed only by interests of vital importance, the burden of proving which rests on their government. - ELROD V. BURNS, 96 S Ct 2673; 427 US 347, (1976).

Parent's right to custody of child is a right encompassed within protection of this amendment which may not be interfered with under guise of protecting public interest by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within competency of state to effect. - REYNOLD V. BABY FOLD, INC., 369 NE 2d 858; 68 Ill 2d 419, appeal dismissed 98 S Ct 1598, 435 US 963, IL, (1977).

 

The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right. - MAY V. ANDERSON, 345 US 528, 533; 73 S Ct 840, 843, (1952).

 

A parent's right to care and companionship of his or her children are so fundamental, as to be guaranteed protection under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. - IN RE: J.S. AND C., 324 A 2d 90; supra 129 NJ Super, at 489.

 

Parent's rights have been recognized as being "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free man." - MEYER V. NEBRASKA, 262 or 426 US 390 ; 43 S Ct 625, (1923).

 

No bond is more precious and none should be more zealously protected by the law as the bond between parent and child." - CARSON V. ELROD, 411 F Supp 645, 649; DC E.D. VA (1976).

 

State Judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights. - GROSS V. STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F 2d 257; (1963).

CUSTODY IS A CONSTITUTIONALLY SECURED RIGHT – ENABLING FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The Court stressed, "the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children rises to a constitutionally secured right, given the centrality of family life as the focus for personal meaning and responsibility.

A child has an equal right to be raised by the father, and must be awarded to the father if he is the better parent, or mother is not interested:

STANLEY V. ILLINOIS, 405 US 645, 651; 92 S Ct 1208, (1972).

 

A parent's right to the custody of his or her children is an element of "liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:

MATTER OF GENTRY, 369 N.W.2d. 889, Mich. Appellate Div. (1983)

 

The rights of parents to the care, custody and nurture of their children is of such character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions, and such right is a fundamental right protected by this amendment (First) and Amendments 5, 9, and 14. -  DOE V. IRWIN, 441 F Supp 1247; U.S. D.C. of Michigan, (1985).

EX PARTE HEARINGS ON CUSTODY ORDERS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Ex Parte conferences, hearings or Orders denying parental rights or personal liberties are unconstitutional, cannot be enforced, can be set aside in federal court, and can be the basis of suits for money damages.

RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844 (1980);

GEISINGER V. VOSE, 352 F.Supp. 104 (1972).

IF MOTHER HAS BOYFRIEND CUSTODY AWARDED TO FATHER

If custodial mother has boyfriend living with her, state can change custody to father.

JARRETT V. JARRETT, 101 S.Ct. 329

FATHER HAS RIGHT TO CUSTODY

Custody can be awarded to father of girls of "tender years" if mother commits perjury, and is otherwise immoral.

BEABER V. BEABER, 322 NE 2d 910.

JUDGES CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR WILLFUL DEPRAVATION OF CUSTODY RIGHTS OR ANY CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

Fathers' Rights Case Law Title 42 USC 1983 is for (federal) civil rights violations. "Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."

"Judges may be punished criminally for willful deprivation of rights on the strength of Title 18 U.S.A. 241 and 242."

[The fact that There are federal rules\laws regarding suing including judges for violations of constitutional rights is proof enough that it occurs.]: - IMBLER V. PACHTMAN, 424 U.S. 409; 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976)

 

"When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional rights, he exercises no discretion or individual judgement; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudice.": PIERSON V. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 at 567 (1967)

 

"Referring both to the objective and subjective elements, we have held that qualified immunity (Ed. Note: or "good faith") would be defeated if an official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. . ." - HARLOW V. FITZGERALD, 102 S.Ct. 2727 at 2737, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)

 

Every person who, under color of any statute ordinance, regulation, custom, or by usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE IN AN ACTION AT LAW SUIT IN EQUITY N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1985 (3) If two or more persons . . . conspire. . for the purpose of depriving. any person. . . of the equal protection of the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages . . . RECOVERY OF DAMAGES AGAINST ANY ONE OR MORE OF THE CONSPIRATORS N0 EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1986 Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs . . . are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do . . . shall be liable . . . EVERY PERSON SHALL BE LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES NO EXCLUSION FOR JUDGES BY ANY ACT OF CONGRESS UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1988: - UNITED STATES CODE, TITLE 42, SECTION 1983

 

"We should, of course, not protect a member of the judiciary "who is in fact guilty of using his power to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good." - GREGOIRE V. BIDDLE, 177 F.2d 579, 581.

 

"Government immunity violates the common law maxim that everyone shall have remedy for an injury done to his person or property." - FIREMAN'S INS/ CO. OF NEWARK, N.J. V. WASHBURN COUNTY, 2 Wis.2d 214, 85 N.W.2d 840 (1957)

 

Immunity fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility, while liability promotes care and caution, which caution and care is owed by the government to its people." - RABON V. ROWEN MEMORIAL HOSP., INC, 269 NSI. 13, 152 S.E.2d 485, 493 (`1967)

 

"Actions by state officers and employees, even if unauthorized or in excess of authority can be actions under 'color of law'." -  STRINGER V. DILGER, 313 F.2d 536 (U.S. Ct. App 10th Circ. - 1963

 

"A judge is not immune from criminal sanctions under the civil rights act."   "State officials acting in their official capacities, even if in abuse of their lawful authority , generally are held to act "under color" of law. This is because such officials are " clothed with the authority" of state law, which gives them power to perpetrate the very wrongs that Congress intended Section 1983 to prevent. " - EX PARTE VIRGINIA, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347 (1879)

 

"The language and purpose of the civil rights acts, are inconsistent with the application of common law notions of official immunity. . . "  - JACOBSEN V. HENNE, 335 F.2d 129, 133 (U.S. Ct. App. 2nd Circ. - 1966) Also see" ANDERSON V. NOSSER, 428 F.2d 183 (U.S. Ct. App. 5th Circ. - 1971)

 

"Governmental immunity is not a defense under (42 USC 1983) making liable every person who under color of state law deprives another person of his civil rights." - WESTBERRY V. FISHER, 309 F.Supp. 95 (District Ct.- of Maine - 1970 "

 

Judicial immunity is no defense to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction." - BRADLEY V. FISHER, U.S. 13 Wall. 335 (1871)

 

As long as a DEFENDANT who abridges a plaintiff's constitutional rights acts pursuant to a statute of local law which empowers him to commit the wrongful act, an action under the Federal Civil Rights statute is established. 42 U.S.C.A. 1981 et seq. - LAVERNE V. CORNING, 316 F.Supp. 629

 

"The Supreme Court initially discussed judicial immunity in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869). In Randall, the Court wrote that judges of superior or general jurisdiction courts were not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts, where the acts, in excess of jurisdiction, are done maliciously or corruptly." [Editor's Note: In more recent cases: Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 it was found that judges were really not acting in a malicious and corrupt manner and the proofs also showed that. Congress by its words and meaning enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and that meaning included judges to be held responsible to an injured plaintiff for the deprivation of Constitutional Rights. Any judge made case finding to the contrary is hereby challenged as unconstitutional and unlawful. No Court has ever challenged the Constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and therefore said Congressionally enacted legislation stands as law. The only way to change an act of Congress is by an act of Congress. No judge can change it and any such findings and changes are not to be upheld in Federal Courts as lawful. No changes in the wording have ever been made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and 1988 and therefore these Congressionally enacted laws are enforceable in the Federal Courts. The only change made to Title 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 took place in 1979. At this time the words "or the District of Columbia" were inserted following "Territory". If any judges or persons representing judges had wanted to make a change this would have been an opportune time to do so. No action was ever taken to change the wording of the law and it remains as such today.]  - RANDALL V. BRIGHAM, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1869).

 

"I agree with the substantive standard announced by the Court today, imposing liability when a public-official DEFENDANT "knew or should have known" of the constitutionally violative effect of his actions. This standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not "reasonably have been expected" to know what he actually did know. Thus the clever and unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights will not evade just punishment for his crimes. I, also agree that this standard applies "across the board," to all "government officials performing discretionary functions.," - Harlow at 2739, Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmum concurring. In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting

 

"Judges are not immune for their nonjudicial activities, i.e., activities which are ministerial or administrative in nature." - SANTIAGO V. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, 435 F.Supp. 136

 

"It is not a judicial function for judge to commit intentional tort, even though tort occurs in courthouse." - YATES V. VILLAGE OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILLINOIS, 209 F.Supp. 757

 

"There was no judicial immunity to civil actions for equitable relief under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 Shore v. Howard. 414 F.Supp. 379 "There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability". Id. "Repeated pattern of failing to advise litigants of their constitutional and statutory rights is serious judicial misconduct." - MATTER OF PEEVES, 480 N.Y.S. 2d 463.

 

"When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction or acts in face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." - RANKIN V. HOWARD, 633 F.2d 844.

 

"There is no judicial immunity from criminal liability." - SHORE V. HOWARD, 414 F.Supp. 379

 

"State judges, as well as federal, have the responsibility to respect and protect persons from violations of federal constitutional rights." - GOSS V. STATE OF ILLINOIS, 312 F2d. 1279 (U.S.Ct.App. - Illinois - 1963)

 

"Conduct of trial judge must be measured by standard of fairness and impartiality." - GREENER V. GREEN, 460 F.2d 1279 (U.S.Ct. App. - Pa. - 1972)

 

Judges must maintain a high standard of judicial performance with particular emphasis upon conducting litigation with scrupulous fairness and impartiality. 28 USCA § 2411; - PFIZER V. LORD, 456 F 2d 532; cert denied 92 S Ct 2411; US Ct App MN, (1972).

 

"A judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes or case law expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost." Id. "Law requires not only impartial tribunal, but that tribunal appears to be impartial." 28 U.S.C.A. 455.-  IN RE TIP-PAHANDS ENTERPRISES, INC., 27 B.R. 780 (U.S. Bankruptcy Ct.)

 

MUNICIPALITY AND SATE MAY BE SUED

A parent may bring a suit against a municipality which failed to provide protection against an ex-spouse, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The parent may recover damages for her son's death and her own injuries, where the police force assured her of protection from a violent ex-spouse:

RAUCCI V. TOWN OF ROTTERDAM, No. 89-7693, U.S. Dist. Ct. --N.Y., April 27, 1990

POLICE OFFICERS NO IMMUNITY

Police officer loses qualified immunity to claim that facially neutral policy has been executed in a discriminatory manner in a domestic violence situation if that police officer knows that the policy has a discriminatory impact:

HANSEN V. CITY OF ) LEGAL DEPT., 864 F.2d 1026, 3rd Cir. (1988)

ATTORNEY’S CAN BE SUED

Attorney can be sued for malpractice under consumer protection laws.

DEBAKEY V. STAGG, 605 SW 2d 631 (1980)

THE COURT HAS A DUTY TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS of the citizen, against any stealthy encroachments thereon." -BOYD V. U.S., 116 US 616, 635, (1885)

" In short, the federal courts could step in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights." - ALLEN v. McCURRY, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)

EVIL ORDERS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Laws and court procedures that are "fair on their faces" but administered "with an evil eye or a heavy hand" was discriminatory and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

YICK WO V. HOPKINS, 118 S.Ct. 356 (1886)

JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED

Justice delayed is justice denied.

MAGNA CHARTA, Art.40, June 15, 1215.

VOID ORDERS

Judge's dismissal for no cause is reversible.

FOMAN V. DAVIS, 371 US 178 (1962)

NON-LAWYERS ENTITLED TO COURT

Non-lawyers can assist or represent litigants in court.

JOHNSON V. AVERY, 89 S.Ct. 747

Members of group who are competent nonlawyers can assist other members of group achieve the goals of the group in court without being charged with "unauthorized practice of law"

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY TRAINMEN V. VIRGINIA , 377 US 1;

NAACP V. BUTTON, 371 US 415 (1962);

SIERRA CLUB V. NORTON, 92 S.Ct. 1561;

UNITED MINE WORKERS V. GIBBS, 383 US 715;

FARETTA V. CALIFORNIA, 422 US 806.

PRO SE TO BE CONSIDERED WITHOUT TECHNICALITY

“Pro Se (Without a Lawyer, representing self) pleadings are to be considered without technicality; pro se litigants pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers.” - HAINES V. KERNER, 92 S.Ct. 594; JENKINS V. MCKEITHEN, 395 US 411, 421 (1969); PICKING V. PENNA. RWY. CO. 151 F.2d 240; PUCKETT V. COX, 456 F.2d 233.

“The pleading of one who pleads pro se for the protection of civil rights should be liberally construed” - BLOOD V. MARGIS, 322 F.2d 1086 (1971)

There are decisions in virtually every federal circuits that generously proclaim that pro per petitions should be construed liberally and that pro per petitioners should be held to less stringent standards than lawyers.  See, e.g., Price v. Johnston (1948) 334 U.S. 266, 292; Chase v. Crips (10th Cir. 1975) 523 F.2d 595, 597; Curtis v. Illinois (7th Cir. 1975) 512 F2d 717; Ham v. North Carolina (4th Cir. 1973) 471 F.2d 406, 407; Hairston v. Alabama (5th Cir. 1972) 465 F.2d 675, 678 n5; Turrell v. Perini (6th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 1231, 1233; Montgomery v. Brierly (3rd Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 552; Pembrook v. Wilson, (9th Cir. 1966) 370 F.2d 37, 40; Whittaker v. Overholster (D.C. Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 447, 448.  See also Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519.

This right is also protected under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.  And within those rights, the pro se litigant's court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than submissions of lawyers.  If the court can reasonably read the submissions, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements.  Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972);  McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).

The courts provide pro se parties wide latitude when construing their pleadings and papers.  When interpreting pro se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine what relief the party desires.  S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992).  See also, United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has special obligation to construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally); Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).  Defendant  has the right to submit pro se briefs on appeal, even though they may be inartfully drawn but the court can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998).  Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants against consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.  U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).

 

 

 

PROHIBITION OF BIAS

United States District Court General Order No. 40, Prohibition of Bias, states:

Prologue

The Court is committed to ensuring that all forms of bias and prejudice are eliminated from the practice of law in our district….

Duties and Procedures

(1) The practice of law before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California must be free from prejudice and bias in any form.  Treatment free of bias must be accorded all other attorneys, litigants, judicial officers, court room jurors or support personnel.  The duty to exercise nonbiased behavior includes the responsibility to avoid comment or behavior manifesting prejudice or bias toward another.  This duty is owed by all attorneys, judges, judicial officers and court personnel in connection with cases pending before the district court.

 

DIRECTORS, THE REAL PARTY OF INTEREST IN CORPORATIONS ENTITLED TO 1ST AMENDMENT SELF REPRESENTATION

A corporation in the U.S.A. is recognized as “person” as defined by the 14th Amendment and is therefore Constitutionally guaranteed the right to self representation.  By law a corporation may be represented by their principles who are the real parties of interest.  This argument at law has been well substantiated in Plaintiffs earlier filings and has not and can not be refuted by any parties.   Rulings buy incompetent judges do not make any new laws.  C.L.D. Const. Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) and Caressa Camille, In.d v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Apeals Board do not make any new law, these cases were ruled in error to the most basic construct of Constitutional law. 

Constitution overrules Common-Law?  Judges and attorneys efforts to usurp the Legislature authority amounts to treason: Article I, Section 1. “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”

It must be noted that the whim and caprice of a judge, no matter at what level of the court, is by no means an establishment of the “will of the people” as represented by the Common Law precedent concept.  The judiciary has no right to legislate law.  The judiciary also has no need or right to interpret the law, the function of the judiciary is to administer the courts.  The judiciary’s vital role is to ensure that the law of the land is fairly followed.  In Common Law, it is clear that no law can exist that cannot be understood by the common man, eliminating the need to “interpret” the law.  I.e. if a law is ambiguous, if it is open to interpretation, then that law does not meet the fundamental construct of Common Law.  In cases where law is ambiguous, the only function of the Judiciary is to send the law back to the legislature.

There is no lawful mandate that any matter must be represented in court by a class of individuals called attorneys or lawyers.  The 13th Amendment which was properly ratified at the Virginia General Assembly on March 12, 1819 and which has subsequently disappeared unlawfully from the Constitution reads:  "If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive, or retain any title of nobility or honour, or shall without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any present, pension, office, or emolument of any kind whatever, from any Emperor, King, Prince, or foreign Power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States, and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of them." dictates that any individual who pledges allegiance to the BAR and takes on the title “Esq” looses their citizenship.  How is it that some judges who themselves, according to this ratified amendment, are not entitled to hold office, go as far as to insist that only ‘attorneys’ may speak for corporations or children.  Not only is such a ruling trying to force attorneys to speak on behalf of corporations unlawful but it is blatantly treasonous to the construct of the Constitution in light of the hated practice in England of courts only allowing Barristers to speak on behalf of persons, which clearly our Constitution eliminates.  Furthermore considering that DEFENDANTS are directly responsible for driving Plaintiff into financial ruin as a consequence of their malicious prosecution and thereby make it impossible for Plaintiffs to afford competent counsel, such a ruling dismissing corporate parties in this basis is clearly utterly unjust.  Corporate parties remain in this case.

A person in law, includes both a natural person, i.e., a human being, and an artificial person, i.e., a corporation. In strict sense, in law, a person is any being capable of having rights and duties and is of two classes only, namely, natural person and legal person. A natural person is a human being who has the capacity for rights and duties. A corporation is a legal person.. See First National Bank of Boston v Belluth, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707. Lawrence v Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440, 210 Va. 138. §1-201(29) of the U.P.C. defines the word “person” as follows: an individual, a corporation, an organization, or other legal entity. The word has been statutorily defined as follows: "Person" includes individual, partnership, and corporation, but does not include governmental unit. 11 U.S.C. §101(30). An individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a trust, any unincorporated organization, or a government or political subdivision thereof. As used in this paragraph the term "trust" shall include only a trust where the interest or interests of the beneficiary or beneficiaries are evidenced by a security. 15 U.S.C. §77(b)(2). An individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-stock company, a business trust, or an unincorporated organization. 15 U.S.C. §78(c)(9). An individual or company. 15 U.S.C. §79(b)(1) "Person" and "whoever" means an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, or any other organization or group of persons. 18 U.S.C. §591(g). The term "person" and the term "whoever" include any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint-stock company. 18 U.S.C. §917(1). Any employee, or agent of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, or corporation. 18 U.S.C. §2510(6). "Person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers. 29 U.S.C. §403 (d). An individual, a corporation, an organization, or other legal entity. U.C.C. §1-201(29). "Person" includes an individual or an organization. U.C.C. §1-201(30). A natural person or an organization. 12 C.F.R. §226.2(v).  Principles of a cooperation represent the person of the corporation and are not only liable for actions of the corporation but are also entitled to speak for the corporation and are in fact the only Real Parties of Interest of the corporation.  An attorney is not a Real Party of Interest for a corporation or for that matter a minor child (other than their own children), consequentially an attorney cannot speak for the corporation or child, everything an attorney submits on behalf of a corporate person or child is by definition of the law, hearsay.

CUSTODY MATTERS DICTATE DUE PROCESS

Cal.App. 1975. Judgment freeing child from custody and control of its parents results in total severance of its natural ties between parents and child and amounts to taking of a "liberty" under due process clause of Constitution.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amends.  5, 14; West's Ann.Civ.Code. Sec. 232.  In re Susan Lynn M., 125 Cal.Rptr. 707, 53 C.A.3d 300.  -8A Cal D 2d-436

Cal.App. 1974.  Parent in dependency proceeding is entitled to due process of law.  In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.

  Notice of allegations upon which deprivation of custody of minor children is predicated is fundamental due process.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.

  Findings of fact made by juvenile court in adjudicating minors to be dependent children of court were conclusory in nature and denied mother of minor children due process of law in that such findings failed to apprise her of court's reason for its decision and did not form adequate basis for review.  West's Ann. Welfare & Inst.Code. Sec.Sec. 600-602, 702, 726(a-c).  In re J.T., 115 Cal.Rptr. 553, 40 C.A.3d 633.  -8A Cal D 2d-436

Cal.App. 1971.  Parent had right to custody of her child of which she could not be deprived in dependency proceeding without essential ingredients of due process, including a fair hearing.  West's Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code. Sed. 600; U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14;  R. v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 97 Cal.Rptr. 158, 19 C.A.3d 895.  -8A Cal D 2d-437

Cal.App. 1970.  Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requisite to due process at adjudicatory state of a state juvenile court proceeding, and United States Supreme Court decision to that effect is applicable to cases pending on direct appeal at time of decision.  West's Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 700. In re W., 91 Cal.Rptr. 702, 12 C.A.3d 1120.  -8A Cal D 2d-438

CUSTODY AND CALIFORNIA CODES

CALIFORNIA CODES

CIVIL CODE

SECTION

711.  Conditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest created, are void.

CALIFORNIA CODES

CIVIL CODE

SECTION

43.  Besides the personal rights mentioned or recognized in the Government Code, every person has, subject to the qualifications and restrictions provided by law, the right of protection from bodily restraint or harm, from personal insult, from defamation, and from injury to his personal relations.

DUE PROCESS DICTATES GOOD CAUSE

C.A.Cal. 1981.  State must ultimately justify depriving person of protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for deprivation.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017.  -8A Cal D 2d-399

Cal. 1971.  In order that presumption satisfy due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment there must be a rational connection between the facts provided and the facts presumed. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.   People v. Montalvo, 482 P.2d 205, 93 Cal. Rptr. 581, 4 C.3d 328, 49 A.L.R.3d 518.

Cal.App. 1977.  If individual is condemned to suffer grievous loss of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law, irrespective of burden imposed upon government agency. ... Fundamental mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant liberty or property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  In re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.  -8A Cal D 2d-424

Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1985.  Where one's liberty is at stake, application of strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes government's burden to justify procedure by showing it has compelling interest which is furthered by procedure in question.  Conservatorship of Waltz, 213 Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.

Cal.App. 4 Dist 1984.  "Procedural due process" rules exist to minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life, liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154 C.A.3d 422.  -8A Cal D 2d-424

Cal. 1977.  When state participates in deprivation of person's right to personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process requires that facts justifying that action be reliably established and, to that end, person must receive hearing after adequate written notice of basis for proposed action and an opportunity to appear in person and to present evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to confrontation by , and opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached decision maker, findings by preponderance of evidence and record of proceeding adequate to permit meaningful judicial or appellate review.  U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.  -8A Cal D 2d-423

Cal. 1980.  Identification of dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.  Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.  -8A Cal D 2d-398

Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1984.  Deprivation of freedom falls within prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and Federal Constitutions. .... Implicit in concept that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative processes is substantive element of one's liberty is that court will require sufficient information to make a reasoned decision that reflects and exercise of discretion; which must be given to important due process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in governmental decision making when individuals are subject to deprivatory action.  West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.  -8A Cal D 2d-424

Cal.App. 1977.  Juvenile proceedings which may result in substantial loss of freedom are regarded as quasi criminal in nature and, as a consequence, fundamental notions of due process and fairness must be strictly observed.  Wets's Ann.Welfare & Inst.Code, Sec. 702.5.  In Matter of Aaron N., 139 Cal.Rptr. 258, 70 C.A.3d 931.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985.  Due process requires that parents be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard at jurisdictional hearings in juvenile court dependency proceedings.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code Sec. 300.  In re C.P., 230 Cal.Rptr. 864, 165 C.A.3d 270.

Cal. 1979.  Minors have a liberty interest that entitles them to due process whenever a state initiates action to deprive them of liberty.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  In re Scott K., 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal.Rptr. 671, 24 C.3d 395, certiorari denied Fare v. Scott K., 100 S.Ct. 468, 444 U.S. 973, 62 L.Ed.2d 388.

Cal. 1977.  Minor is entitled to protection of due process whenever state itself initiates action, whether civil or quasi criminal, to deprive minor of his liberty.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.

  Even conditional liberty interest, such as that of minor, is entitled to protections of due process when state is involved to any significant degree in its diminution.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.

Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.  -8A Cal D 2d-377

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

DUE PROCESS DICTATES AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND FAIR TRIAL BY JURY

U.S.Cal. 1982.  Due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial of auasi-judicial capacities.   U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72 L.Ed.2d 1.  -8A Cal D 2d-385

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Due process requires that government abide by basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.

D.D.Cal 1975.  At heart of any due process hearing is requirement of an impartial decision maker.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.  Ponce v Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.  -8A Cal D 2d-386

Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.  -8A Cal D 2d-377

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.  -8A Cal D 2d-377

D.C.Cal. 1980.  In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party before him.  U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.  McClure v. Harris, 503

DUE PROCESS DICTATES COMPETENT AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:

Cal.App.  1966.  The essentials of due process are regular and orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.  State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49 Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.

Cal.App. 1859.  There are two essentials to due process in a judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.  West's Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.  Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173 C.A.2d 613.

D.C.Cal 1975.  The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact laws which will deprive individuals of their liberty without due process.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.  Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F.Supp 871, supplemented 402 F.Supp. 623.

DUE PROCESS DICTATES FAIRNESS:

Cal.Ap. 1982.  Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly manner.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  White v. Division of Medical Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d 699.  -8A Cal D 2d-387

Cal.App. 1974.  Procedural due process requires that the property of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.  Ursino v. Superior Court, In and For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.  -8A Cal D 2d-387

U.S.Cal. 1985.  Very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case but, rather, procedural due process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exception.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 473 U.S. 305, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, on remand 111 F.R.D. 595.  -8A Cal D 2d-385

Cal.App.  1962.  Due process requires fair trial before impartial tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases must known, consider, and appraise evidence.  Le Strange v. City of Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.  -8A Cal D 2d-385

DUE PROCESS DICTATES AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND FAIR TRIAL BY JURY

U.S.Cal. 1982.  Due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial of auasi-judicial capacities.   U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72 L.Ed.2d 1.  -8A Cal D 2d-385

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Due process requires that government abide by basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.

D.D.Cal 1975.  At heart of any due process hearing is requirement of an impartial decision maker.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.  Ponce v Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.  -8A Cal D 2d-386

Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.  -8A Cal D 2d-377

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.  -8A Cal D 2d-377

D.C.Cal. 1980.  In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party before him.  U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.  McClure v. Harris, 503

DUE PROCESS DICTATES COMPETENT AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:

Cal.App.  1966.  The essentials of due process are regular and orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.  State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49 Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.

Cal.App. 1859.  There are two essentials to due process in a judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.  West's Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.  Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173 C.A.2d 613.

DUE PROCESS DICTATES GOOD CAUSE

C.A.Cal. 1981.  State must ultimately justify depriving person of protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for deprivation.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017.  -8A Cal D 2d-399

Cal.App. 1977.  If individual is condemned to suffer grievous loss of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law, irrespective of burden imposed upon government agency. ... Fundamental mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant liberty or property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  In re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.  -8A Cal D 2d-424

Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1985.  Where one's liberty is at stake, application of strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes government's burden to justify procedure by showing it has compelling interest which is furthered by procedure in question.  Conservatorship of Waltz, 213 Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.

Cal.App. 4 Dist 1984.  "Procedural due process" rules exist to minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life, liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154 C.A.3d 422.  -8A Cal D 2d-424

Cal. 1977.  When state participates in deprivation of person's right to personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process requires that facts justifying that action be reliably established and, to that end, person must receive hearing after adequate written notice of basis for proposed action and an opportunity to appear in person and to present evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to confrontation by , and opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached decision maker, findings by preponderance of evidence and record of proceeding adequate to permit meaningful judicial or appellate review.  U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.  -8A Cal D 2d-423

Cal. 1980.  Identification of dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.  Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.  -8A Cal D 2d-398

Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1984.  Deprivation of freedom falls within prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and Federal Constitutions. .... Implicit in concept that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative processes is substantive element of one's liberty is that court will require sufficient information to make a reasoned decision that reflects and exercise of discretion; which must be given to important due process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in governmental decision making when individuals are subject to deprivatory action.  West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.  -8A Cal D 2d-424

Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291.  -8A Cal D 2d-377

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

Due Process, Fair Hearing & Trial By Jury LAW DEFINED

8A Cal D 2d-374

U.S. Cal 1952.  Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental of are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.  Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.

8A Cal D 2d-375

C.A.Cal. 1967. The present concept of due process stems from the American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.  Howard v. U.S., 372 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1356.

8A Cal D 2d-377

Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

Cal.App.  192.  Due process is not concerned with mere technical formalism, but rather it is the substance that determines whether a litigant has been deprived of it.  Vita-Pharmacals, Inc. v. Board of Pharmacy, 243 P.2d 890, 110 C.A.2d 826.

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal. 1979.  Application of the due process clauses of the California Constitution must be determined in the context of the individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private interests at stake.  West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.  People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.

Cal 1979. Touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.  U.S.C.A.Const. Ammend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a).  Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 24 C.3d 22, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 209, 444 U.S. 900, 62 L.Ed.2d 136.

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal.App. 3Dist. 1985.  Cardinal principle of substantive due process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by its enactment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  People v. Armbruster, 210 Cal.Rptr.  11, 163 C.A.3d 660.

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal.App. 1979.  Substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.  U.S.C.A.Const.  Amend. 14; West's Ann.  Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.  In re David B., 154 Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.

8A Cal D 2d-385

U.S.Cal. 1985.  Very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case but, rather, procedural due process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exception.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 473 U.S. 305, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, on remand 111 F.R.D. 595.

8A Cal D 2d-385

U.S.Cal. 1982.  Due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial of auasi-judicial capacities.   U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72 L.Ed.2d 1.

C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986.  Due process clause guarantees aggrieved party opportunity to present case and have its merits fairly judged.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.

Under due process clause, every party is entitled to impartial tribunal.  Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.

C.A.Cal 1967.  Due process is denied where the procedure tends to shock the sense of fair play.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.  Howard v. U.S., 375 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1365.

8A Cal D 2d-386

D.D.Cal 1975.  At heart of any due process hearing is requirement of an impartial decision maker.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.  Ponce v Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Procedural due process must obtain whenever individual is subject to "grievous loss" at hands of state or its instrumentalities.  42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp 1113.

Rudimentary principles of due process require presence of counsel when rights of individual are seriously threatened by governmental action.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp 1113.

8A Cal D 2d-387

Cal.Ap. 1982.  Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly manner.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  White v. Division of Medical Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d 699.

8A Cal D 2d-387

Cal.App. 1974.  Procedural due process requires that the property of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.  Ursino v. Superior Court, In and For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.

Cal.App.  1966.  The essentials of due process are regular and orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.  State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49 Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.

Cal.App.  1962.  Due process requires fair trial before impartial tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases must known, consider, and appraise evidence.  Le Strange v. City of Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.

Cal.App. 1859.  There are two essentials to due process in a judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.  West's Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.  Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173 C.A.2d 613.

C.A.9 (Cal) 1985.  If individual bringing procedural due process challenge demonstrates likelihood of irreparable harm, resulting from lack of predeprivation hearing, it is unlikely that government will be able to demonstrate any public interest that will overcome individual's interest, and some additional form of predeprivation process will probably be require; in absence of such showing, however, courts must balance governmental interests in retaining existing process against private interest that will effect and probability of erroneous deprivation associated with that process.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Jolly v. U.S. 764 F.2d 642.

C.A.Cal 1983.  Central meaning of procedural due process is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.

C.A.Cal 1985.  Fundamental requirements of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in terms of the threatened conduct, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Sieffa Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305.

D.D.Cal 1984.  Opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process is opportunity which must be granted at meaningful time and in meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. 599 F.Supp. 69.

D.C.Cal. 1980.  In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party before him.  U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.  McClure v. Harris, 503

D.C.Cal. 1970.  The due process right to predetermination hearing, with right to confront and question witnesses, is the constitutional norm and not the exception when government action seriously injures an individual and the crucial decision is based upon facts alleged by a third party.  Crow v. California Dept. of Human Resources, 325 F.Supp. 1314, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2495, 408 U.S. 924, 33 L.Ed.2d 335, revised 490 F.2d 580, vacated 95 S.Ct. 1110, 420 U.S. 917, 43 L.Ed.2d 388.

Cal. 1985.  Fundamental fairness includes both right to adequate notice and right to defend against charged violations.  Harry Carian Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.  (United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO), 703 P.2d 27, 216 Cal.Rptr. 688, 39 C.3d 209.

Cal. 1982.  Rudiments of fair play include notice, opportunity to respond, and a hearing.  West's Ann.Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend, 14.  In re Marriage of Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal.Rptr. 508, 31 C.3d 637.

Cal. 1979.  Where prior notice of potentially adverse decision is constitutionally required, such notice must, at minimum, be reasonably calculated to afford affected persons realistic opportunity to protect their interests.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 14.  Horn v. Ventura County, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 24 C.3d 605.

Cal. 1975.  Fundamental requisite of due process is the meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions.  People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 13 C.3d 867.

Cal. 1968.  Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Endler v. Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.

Cal.App.2Dist. 1989.  Due process requires notice and opportunity for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Cal. Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7, 15.  Bennett v. Bodily, 259 Cal.Rptr. 199, 211 C.A.3d 133, review denied.

8A Cal D 2d-387

C.A.Cal 1983.  Central meaning of procedural due process is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.

8A Cal D 2d-390

Cal.App. 2 Dist.  1987.  A fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co., 242 Cal.Rptr. 605, 196 C.A.3d 1526.

384, 13 C.3d 867.

Cal. 1968.  Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Endler v. Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.

103 S.Ct. 1497, 460 U.S. 1051, 75 L.Ed.2d 929.

Cal.App. 1981. One aspect of the procedural protection of due process is the opportunity to be heard within a reasonably prompt period of time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Garcia v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Ed., 177 Cal.Rptr. 29, 123 C.A.3d 807.

8A Cal D 2d-377

Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal. 1979.  Application of the due process clauses of the California Constitution must be determined in the context of the individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private interests at stake.  West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.  People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.

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Cal.App. 3Dist. 1985.  Cardinal principle of substantive due process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by its enactment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  People v. Armbruster, 210 Cal.Rptr.  11, 163 C.A.3d 660.

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Cal.App. 1979.  Substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.  U.S.C.A.Const.  Amend. 14; West's Ann.  Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.  In re David B., 154 Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.

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D.C.Cal 1982.  Question as to whether individual has an interest protected by due process is not merely "weight" of the interests but rather, whether nature of the interest is one within contemplation of "liberty or property" language of Fourteenth Amendment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.

D.C.Cal. 1980.  It is nature of interest at stake in proceeding, that determines whether constitutional requirements of due process apply; alleged violations of "rights" that arise exclusively out of failure to comply with procedures provided by city charter, ordinances and regulations do not sustain a federal constitutional claim.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Contra Costa Theater, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F.Supp. 87. affirmed 686 F.2d 798, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1777, 460 U.S. 1085, 76 L.Ed.2d 349.

D.C.Cal.1973.  To determine whether due process requirements apply, court must not look to the weight, but to the nature of the interests at stake.  U.S.C.A.Const Amends. 5, 14.  Perkins v. Regents of University of California, 353 F.Supp. 618.

D.C.Cal. 1972.  To receive due process protection, interests in dispute need not reach level of the traditional constitutional "right." U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.   Keller v. Kate Maremont Foundation, 365 F.Supp. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortg. Investers, 504 F.2d 483.

Due process analysis requires consideration of precise nature of governmental function and private interests which will be affected by the government action.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.  Keller v. Kate Maremont Foundation, 365 F.Supp. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortg. Investors, 504 F.2d 483.

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Procedural due process is not required only when some "vested right" is being impaired.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.   Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct 2414, 421 U.S. 1010, 44 L.Ed.2d 678, reversed Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S.Ct 1551, 425 U.S. 308, 47 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Sup. 1113.

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Due process requires that government abide by basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.

Cal. 1980.  Identification of dictates of due process generally requires consideration of (1) private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, (3) dignitary interest in informing individuals of nature, grounds and consequences of the action and in enabling them to present their side of the story before a responsible governmental official, and (4) governmental interest, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.  Van Atta v. Scott, 613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149, 27 C.3d 424.

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Cal.App 2 Dist. 1984.  Identification of dictates of state due process, generally requires consideration of:  private interests that will be affected by official actions; risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; dignitary interest in informing individual of nature, grounds and consequences of action and enabling them to present their side of story before responsible governmental official; and governmental  interests, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.  West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.  Matter of Thomas, 206 Cal.Rptr. 719, 161 C.A.3d 721.

Cal.App. 1982.  Due process to be afforded in given case depends upon private interests that will be affected by official actions: risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, government's interest, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Broussard v. Regents of University of California, 184 Cal.Rptr. 460, 131 C.A.3d 636.

Cal.App. 1980.  When injury to reputation is combined with loss or damage to property interests of an individual, compliance with fundamental precepts of due process is imperative.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Lackner v. St Joseph Convalescent Hospital, Inc. 165 Cal.Rptr. 198, 106 C.A.3d 524.

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253(1). Nature in general

C.A.9(Cal) 1989.  In determining whether substantive due process rights have been violated, court will look to such factors as needed for governmental action in question, relationship between need and action, extent of harm inflicted, and whether action was taken in good faith or for purpose of causing harm.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1390, certiorari denied Doody v. Sinaloa Lake Owners Association, Inc., 110 S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493.

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255. Deprivation of life or liberty in general.

C.A.9(Cal) 1990.  Fundamental requirement of procedural due process are notice and opportunity to be heard before government may deprive person of protected liberty or property interest  Conner v. City of Santa Ana, 897 F.2d 1487

C.A.Cal. 1982.  Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Dash, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 683 F.2d 1229.

C.A.Cal. 1981.  State must ultimately justify depriving person of protected liberty interest by determining that good cause exists for deprivation.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017.

S.D.Cal. 1989.  Deprivation of liberty must be accompanied by procedural safeguards; trial court must consider significance of individual's interest, risk of erroneous determination through procedures used, and probable value of additional safeguards.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.  U.S. v. Terrones, 712 F.Supp. 786.

D.C.Cal. 1984.  State must afford an individual certain procedural protections against deprivatory governmental action whenever there is a Fourteenth Amendment property of liberty interest at stake.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.  Conti v. Dyer, 593 F.Supp. 696.

D.C.Cal. 1980.  When liberty interest is impaired by arbitrary action of government, constitutional guarantee of due process has been violated.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Kindem v. City of Alameda, 502 F.Supp. 1108.

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D.C.Cal 1975.  The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact laws which will deprive individuals of their liberty without due process.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983.  Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F.Supp 871, supplemented 402 F.Supp. 623.

D.C.Cal. 1975.  The purpose of due process hearing is to safeguard from deprivation the liberty or property rights of protected persons, and this can only be done where the requisite hearing is held before the decision maker so that the decision maker can sift through the facts, weigh the evidence and reach the appropriate conclusion.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.  Ponce v. Housing Authority of Yulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.

Cal. 1984.  Procedures necessary to ensure reliability in fact finding process when state participates in deprivation of personal liberty are required by due process.  West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15.  People v. Geiger, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 35 C.3d 510.

Cal. 1977.  When state participates in deprivation of person's right to personal liberty, even conditional liberty, due process requires that facts justifying that action be reliably established and, to that end, person must receive hearing after adequate written notice of basis for proposed action and an opportunity to appear in person and to present evidence in his own behalf, and he has right to confrontation by , and opportunity to cross-examine, adverse witnesses, a neutral and detached decision maker, findings by preponderance of evidence and record of proceeding adequate to permit meaningful judicial or appellate review.  U.S.C.S.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 19 C.3d 921.

Cal. 1975.  Due process clause requires proof beyond reasonable doubt not only of guilt of defendant in traditional criminal prosecution but also of dispositive fact or facts in any proceeding in which state threatens to deprive individual of his "good name and freedom."  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann. Const. art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal.Rptr. 488, 14 C.3d 306.

Cal. 1970.  Where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by states simply on showing that regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of the proper state purpose; the state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling and the law must be shown necessary and not merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.  Cisty of Carmel-by-the-sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 2 C.3d 259, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313.

Cal. 1968.  State cannot deprive person of his life, liberty, or property without affording him opportunity to be heard by tribunal empowered to decide lawfulness of depravation.  In re Harris, 466 P.2d 148, 72 Cal.Rptr. 340, 69 C.2d 486.

Cal. 1963.  Fourteenth Amendment in declaring that state shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law gives to each of these an equal sanction, recognizing liberty and property as co-existent human rights, and debars the states from any unwarranted interference with either.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 379 P.2d 22, 28 Cal.Rptr. 718, 59 C.2d 247.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1989.  Right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law is fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by Federal and State Constitutions.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann. Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  Redevelopment Agency of City of Concord v. Tobriner, 264 Cal.Rptr. 481, 215 C.A.3d 1087, review denied.
Mandate of due process is that person must be afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant liberty or property interest.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  Redevelopment Agency of City of Concord v. Tobriner, 264 Cal.Rptr. 481, 215 C.A.3d 1087, review denied.

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Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1985.  Where one's liberty is at stake, application of strict-scrutiny test is required and it becomes government's burden to justify procedure by showing it has compelling interest which is furthered by procedure in question.  Conservatorship of Waltz, 213 Cal.Rptr. 529, 167 C.A.3d 835.

Cal.App. 4 Dist 1984.  "Procedural due process" rules exist to minimize risk of substantively unfair or mistaken deprivation of life, liberty or property by enabling persons to contest basis on which government proposes to deprive them of their protected interests.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5. McCaffrey v. Preston, 201 Cal.Rptr. 252, 154 C.A.3d 422.

Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1984.  Deprivation of freedom falls within prohibition against deprivation of liberty expressed in State and Federal Constitutions.  West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a); U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.

  Implicit in concept that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative processes is substantive element of one's liberty is that court will require sufficient information to make a reasoned decision that reflects and exercise of discretion; which must be given to important due process value of promoting accuracy and reasonable predictability in governmental decision making when individuals are subject to deprivatory action.  West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7(a).  People v. Davis, 207 Cal.Rptr. 18, 160 C.A.3d 970.

Cal.App. 1979.  due process clauses of State and Federal Constitutions operate to prevent state from depriving any person of life, liberty or property without due process.  West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  In re Watson, 154 Cal.Rptr. 151, 91 C.A.3d 455.

Cal.App. 1977.  If individual is condemned to suffer grievous loss of liberty, he must first be accorded due process of law, irrespective of burden imposed upon government agency.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  In re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.

  Fundamental mandate of Fourteenth Amendment is that person be afforded notice and opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of significant liberty or property interest U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  In re Anderson, 140 Cal.Rptr. 546, 73 C.A.3d 38.

Cal.App. 1977.  Procedural due process requires that before an individual is deprived of property or his life and liberty he must be given notice and a hearing in order to determine the propriety of the deprivation upon consideration of elements of fundamental fairness and justice.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7.  Abel v. Cory, 139 Cal.Rptr. 555, 71 C.A.3d 589.

VOID JUDGMENTS MUST BE SET ASIDE

A void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court,  People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994). 

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5 – Triad Energy Corp. v. McNell  110 F.R.D. 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). A void judgment is one which shows upon the face of the record a want of jurisdiction in the court assuming to render the judgment, which want of jurisdiction may be either of the person, or of the subject-matter generally, or of the particular question attempted to be decided or the relief assumed to be given. (Citations omitted). 160 Tenn. at 336, 24 S.W.2d at 883. A void judgment lacks validity anywhere and is subject to attack from any angle. State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Sandefur, 215 Tenn. 690, 701, 389 S.W.2d 266, 271 (1965); Acuff v. Daniel, 215 Tenn. 520, 525, 387 S.W.2d 796, 798 (1965).

A "final" but void order can have no preclusive effect. " 'A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.' [Citation.]" ( Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514 [55 P. 390].) (Ibid)

In further alternative, I summit that when the US Supreme Court decided that a decision of the state court is binding on the Federal court as cited by the Defendant, it provides a condition: "For reasons already discussed at length, nothing in the language or legislative history of [449 U.S. 90, 104] 1983 proves any congressional intent to deny binding effect to a state-court judgment or decision when the state court, acting within its proper jurisdiction, has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claims, and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights." And: " In short, the federal courts could step in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights." ALLEN v. McCURRY, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)

"Speaking generally, any acts which exceed the defined power of a court in any instance, whether that power be defined by constitutional provisions, express statutory declaration, or rules developed by the courts and followed under the doctrine of stare decisis, are in excess of jurisdiction, in so far as that term is used to indicate that those acts may be restrained by prohibition or annulled on certiorari. " (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. (2d) 280, 291 [109 P. (2d) 942, 132 A.L.R. 715].)

Thus, where the action of a court is in violation of constitutional restrictions upon its power, it has been held that the court has exceeded its authority. (Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. (2d) 405 [106 P. (2d) 411]; McClatchy v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. 413 [51 Pac. 696, 39 L.R.A. 691]; Langdon v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 41 [223 Pac. 72].)

Where statutory limitations or restrictions upon a court's power to act are violated, many cases have held that such unauthorized acts are in excess of the court's jurisdiction for purposes of certiorari or prohibition. (See, for example, modification of court's judgment or the granting of a new trial in violation of statutory limitations on such power: Treat v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. (2d) 636 [62 P. (2d) 147]; Lankton v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. (2d) 694 [55 P. (2d) 1170]; Stanton v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 478 [261 Pac. 1001]; Diamond v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. 732 [210 Pac. 36]; Prothero v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 439 [238 Pac. 357]; Estate of Paulsen, 179 Cal. 528 [178 Pac. 143]; Lamg v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 491, [12 Pac. 306, 416]; Colthurst v. Justice's Court, 100 Cal. App. 146 [279 Pac. 812].

Failure of a court or tribunal of limited statutory jurisdiction to comply with the express limitations contained in the statute: Olcese v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 566 [292 Pac. 964]; Texas Co. v. Bank of America etc. Assn., 5 Cal. (2d) 35 [53 P. (2d) 127]; Sprcckels Sugar Co. v. Industrial Accident Com., 186 Cal. 256 [199 Pac. 8].

Issuance of an injunction against the enforcement of a public statute in violation of a statutory limitation on such power: Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672 [154 Pac. 845]; Evans v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. (2d) 563 [96 P. (2d) 107]; Loftis v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. App. (2d) 346 [77 P. (2d) 491].

Attempted use of bail deposited by a third person in satisfaction of the fine levied against a defendant in violation of statutory restrictions: Rodman v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. (2d) 262 [89 P. (2d) 109]; Hudson v. Police Court of Oakland, 39 Cal. App. 149 [178 Pac. 172]; Paton v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 475 [99 P. (2d) 698].)

Similarly, there are certain procedural rules developed by the courts which operate as a limitation on their power and are so fundamental in their nature that any violation thereof constitutes an excess of jurisdiction for the purposes of certiorari or prohibition. (For example, failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by statute before resorting to a court of law to challenge the order of an administrative agency: Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, supra; United States v. Superior Codurt, 19 Cal. (2d) 189 [120 P. (2d) 26]; Louis Eckart B. Co. v. Unemployment R. Com., 47 Cal. App. (2d) 844 [119 P. (2d) 227]. Failure to join an indispensable party in an action where his rights will inevitably be affected by the court's decree: Bank of California v. Superior court, 16 Cal. (2d) 516 [106 P. (2d) 879].)  District v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 20 Cal. 2d 348, 125 P.2d 490 (Cal. 05/01/1942)

 

DUE PROCESS

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U.S. Cal 1952.  Due process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental of are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.  Rochin v. People of Cal., 72 S.Ct. 205, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L.Ed. 183, 25 A.L.R.2d 1396.

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C.A.Cal. 1967. The present concept of due process stems from the American ideal of fairness in the treatment of all.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.  Howard v. U.S., 372 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1356.

C.A.Cal. 1965.  In protecting any defendant's constitutional rights, federal courts look beyond form to substance.  Pool v. U.S., 344 F.2d 943, certiorari denied 86 S.Ct. 73, 382 U.S. 832, 15 L.Ed.2d 76.

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Cal.App. 1954.  Under constitutional guaranties, no right of an individual, valuable to him pecunirily or otherwise, can be justly taken away without its being done conformably to principle of justice which afford due process of law unless the law constitutionally otherwise provides, and due process of law does not mean according to the whim, caprice, or will of the judge but according to the law.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

Judicial absolutism is not a part of the American way of life, and the odious doctrine that the end justifies the means does not prevail in our system for the administration of justice.  In re Buchman's Estate, 267 P.2d 73, 123 C.A.2d 546, 47 A.L.R.2d 291

Cal.App.  192.  Due process is not concerned with mere technical formalism, but rather it is the substance that determines whether a litigant has been deprived of it.  Vita-Pharmacals, Inc. v. Board of Pharmacy, 243 P.2d 890, 110 C.A.2d 826.

Law Rev. 1966.  The constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment 39 So.Cal.L.R. 378

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Law Rev. 1961.  The process of prescribing "due process".  49 S.L.R. 215

Law.Rev. 1960. The second American revolution: free enterprise under the Bill of Rights.  46 A.B.A.J. 597.

Law Rev. 1959.  Federal Encroachment on state rights: the Fourteenth Amendment.  45. A.B.A.J. 1044.

Law Rev. 1958.  Due process of law.  5 U.C.L.A. Law R. 661

Law Rev. 1954.  Due process: defendant's rights where valid statute is applied in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  1 U.C.L.A.Law R. 596.

Law Rev. 1954.  History of Fourteenth Amendment, conceived of as merely declaratory.  7 Stan.L.R. 3.

Law Rev. 1953.  Crosskey theory of erroneous construction of Fourteenth Amendment.  41 C.L.R. 209, 224.

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251.3.  Reasonableness or arbitrariness; rational basis and relation to object.

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal. 1979.  Application of the due process clauses of the California Constitution must be determined in the context of the individual's due process liberty interests in freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures; thus, when a person is deprived of a statutory conferred benefit, due process analysis must start, not with a judicial attempt to decide whether the statute has created an "entitlement" that can be defined as "liberty" or "property", but with an assessment of what procedural protections are constitutionally required in light of the governmental and private interests at stake.  West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.  People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal Rptr. 316, 25 C.3d 260.

Cal 1979. Touchstone of due process is fundamental fairness.  U.S.C.A.Const. Ammend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1 Sec.Sec. 7(a).  Salas v. Cortez, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal.Rptr. 529, 24 C.3d 22, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 209, 444 U.S. 900, 62 L.Ed.2d 136.

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal.App. 3Dist. 1985.  Cardinal principle of substantive due process is that a law which deprives a person of life, liberty, or property must not be product of arbitrary legislative judgment; such a law must be reasonably related to the object sought to be attained by its enactment.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  People v. Armbruster, 210 Cal.Rptr.  11, 163 C.A.3d 660.

8A Cal D 2d-382

Cal.App. 1979.  Substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with a person's fundamental right to life, liberty or property by unreasonable or arbitrary legislation.  U.S.C.A.Const.  Amend. 14; West's Ann.  Const. art. 1 Sec. 7.  In re David B., 154 Cal.Rptr. 63, 91 C.A.3d 184.

8A Cal D 2d-385

U.S.Cal. 1985.  Very nature of the due process inquiry indicates that the fundamental fairness of a particular procedure does not turn on the result obtained in any individual case but, rather, procedural due process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exception.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 473 U.S. 305, 87 L.Ed.2d 220, on remand 111 F.R.D. 595.

8A Cal D 2d-385

U.S.Cal. 1982.  Due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial of quasi-judicial capacities.   U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 456 U.S. 188, 72 L.Ed.2d 1.

C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986.  Due process clause guarantees aggrieved party opportunity to present case and have its merits fairly judged.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.

Under due process clause, every party is entitled to impartial tribunal.  Jackson Water Works, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com'n of State of Cal., 793 F.2d 1090, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 1334, 479 U.S. 1102, 94 L.E.2d 184.

C.A.Cal 1967.  Due process is denied where the procedure tends to shock the sense of fair play.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 5.  Howard v. U.S., 375 F.2d 294, certiorari denied 87 S.Ct. 2129, 388 U.S. 915, 18 L.Ed.2d 1365.

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D.D.Cal 1975.  At heart of any due process hearing is requirement of an impartial decision maker.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 5.  Ponce v Housing Authority of Tulare County, 389 F.Supp. 635.

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Procedural due process must obtain whenever individual is subject to "grievous loss" at hands of state or its instrumentalities.  42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp 1113.

Rudimentary principles of due process require presence of counsel when rights of individual are seriously threatened by governmental action.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 6, 14. Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct. 2414, 421 U.S. 101, 44 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp 1113.

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Cal.Ap. 1982.  Fundamental fairness, i.e. due process, includes right to present legal and factual issues in deliberate and orderly maner.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  White v. Division of Medical Quality, Bd. of Medical Quality Assur., 180 Cal.Rptr. 516, 128 C.A.3d 699.

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Cal.App. 1974.  Procedural due process requires that the property of a deprivation of substantial right to be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.  Ursino v. Superior Court, In and For City and County of San Francisco, 114 Cal.Rptr. 404, 39 C.A.3d 611.

Cal.App.  1966.  The essentials of due process are regular and orderly procedure in court of competent jurisdiction, notice to defendant, opportunity for defendant to be heard, and fair hearing.  State Acting By and Through Dept. of Water Resources v. Natomas Co., 49 Cal.Rptr 64, 239 C.A.2d 547.

Cal.App.  1962.  Due process requires fair trial before impartial tribunal, and such trial requires that person or body who decides cases must known, consider, and appraise evidence.  Le Strange v. City of Berkley, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 210 C.A.2d 313.

Cal.App. 1859.  There are two essentials to due process in a judicial proceeding: (1) that the court have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the action, and (2) that the parties have reasonable notice and an opportunity for hearing.  West's Ann.Const.art. 1, Sec.Sec. 2, 13.  Datta v. Staab, 343 P.2d 977, 173 C.A.2d 613.

Law Rev 1977.  Standards of judicial review.  50 So.Cal.L.R. 689.

NOTICE AND HEARING.

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C.A.9 (Cal) 1985.  If individual bringing procedural due process challenge demonstrates likelihood of irreparable harm, resulting from lack of predeprivation hearing, it is unlikely that government will be able to demonstrate any public interest that will overcome individual's interest, and some additional form of predeprivation process will probably be require; in absence of such showing, however, courts must balance governmental interests in retaining existing process against private interest that will effect and probability of erroneous deprivation associated with that process.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Jolly v. U.S. 764 F.2d 642.

C.A.Cal 1983.  Central meaning of procedural due process is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Orloff v. Cleland, 708 F.2d 372.

C.A.Cal 1985.  A Fundamental requirements of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in terms of the threatened conduct, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Sieffa Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305.

D.D.Cal 1984.  Opportunity to be heard guaranteed by due process is opportunity which must be granted at meaningful time and in meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Aminoil, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. 599 F.Supp. 69.

D.C.Cal. 1980.  In order to satisfy fair hearing requirement of due process clause, a tribunal, whether administrative or judicial, must be impartial; adjudicator may neither have pecuniary interest in outcome nor have been target of personal abuse or criticism from party before him.  U.S.C.A.Const Amend. 14.  McClure v. Harris, 503

D.C.Cal. 1970.  The due process right to predetermination hearing, with right to confront and question witnesses, is the constitutional norm and not the exception when government action seriously injures an individual and the crucial decision is based upon facts alleged by a third party.  Crow v. California Dept. of Human Resources, 325 F.Supp. 1314, certiorari denied 92 S.Ct. 2495, 408 U.S. 924, 33 L.Ed.2d 335, revised 490 F.2d 580, vacated 95 S.Ct. 1110, 420 U.S. 917, 43 L.Ed.2d 388.

Cal. 1985.  Fundamental fairness includes both right to adequate notice and right to defend against charged violations.  Harry Carian Sales v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.  (United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO), 703 P.2d 27, 216 Cal.Rptr. 688, 39 C.3d 209.

Cal. 1982.  Rudiments of fair play include notice, opportunity to respond, and a hearing.  West's Ann.Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend, 14.  In re Marriage of Flaherty, 646 P.2d 179, 183 Cal.Rptr. 508, 31 C.3d 637.

Cal. 1979.  Where prior notice of potentially adverse decision is constitutionally required, such notice must, at minimum, be reasonably calculated to afford affected persons realistic opportunity to protect their interests.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend 14.  Horn v. Ventura County, 596 P.2d 1134, 156 Cal.Rptr. 718, 24 C.3d 605.

Cal. 1975.  Fundamental requisite of due process is the meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions.  People v. Coleman, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 13 C.3d 867.

Cal. 1968.  Since right to hearing is one of rudiments of fair play assured by Fourteenth Amendment, there can be no compromise on footing of convenience or expediency when that minimal requirement has been neglected or ignored.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Endler v. Schutzbank, 436, P.2d 297, 65 Cal.Rptr. 297, 68 C.2d 162.

Cal.App.2Dist. 1989.  Due process requires notice and opportunity for a hearing before an impartial tribunal.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Cal. Const.Art. 1, Sec. 7, 15.  Bennett v. Bodily, 259 Cal.Rptr. 199, 211 C.A.3d 133, review denied.

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Cal.App. 2 Dist.  1987.  A fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and a meaningful manner.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co., 242 Cal.Rptr. 605, 196 C.A.3d 1526.

Cal.App. 2Dist. 1983.  Adequate notice prior to imposition of sanctions is mandated not only by statute, but also by due process clauses of both State and Federal Constitutions.  Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  O'Brien v. Cseh, 196 Cal.Rptr. 409, 148 C.A.3d 957.

Cal.App.2Dist. 1983.  Requirement of notice is so fundamental to concepts of due process that it is deemed jurisdictional in nature.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.  Oats by Oats v Oats, 196, Cal.Rptr. 20, 148 C.A.3d 416.

Cal.App.2Dist.  1988.  At a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity for hearing.  West's Ann.Cal. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 7.  Menefee & Son v. Department of Food & Agriculture, 245 Cal.Rptr.  166, 199 C.A.3d 774.

Cal.App. 3Dist. 1987.  For purposes of due process analysis, notice procedures should be evaluated not in hyper technical situation but according to common experience; what is proper notice in given situation must be determined on case-by-case basis.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.  Sonoma Subaru, Inc. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California (Subaru of Northern California), 234 Cal.Rptr. 226, 189 C.A.3d 13, review denied.

Cal.App.5Dist. 1983.  Notice and opportunity to be heard are due process prerequisites for adequate administrative proceedings U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Drum v. Fresno County Dept. of Public Works, 192 Cal.Rptr. 782, 144 C.A.3d 777.

Cal.App. 1982.  Persons who settle their claims of right and duty through judicial process must be given meaningful opportunity to be heard, including right to appointed counsel under certain circumstances, regardless of whether actions labeled civil or criminal.  Ventura County v. Tillett, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741, 133 C.A.3d 105 certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1497, 460 U.S. 1051, 75 L.Ed.2d 929.

Cal.App. 1981. One aspect of the procedural protection of due process is the opportunity to be heard within a reasonably prompt period of time. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. Garcia v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Ed., 177 Cal.Rptr. 29, 123 C.A.3d 807.

Cal.App. 1980.  Essence of procedural due process is that the individual be given adequate notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of a fundamental right.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend 14.  Lackner v. St. Joseph Convalescent Hospital, Inc., 165 Cal.Rptr. 198.

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Cal.App.  1980.  A fundamental requirement of due process is opportunity to be heard and principles of due process are fully applicable to administrative proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature, but no particular form or proceeding is required so long as statute provides for a "reasonable" opportunity to be heard, and what is a "reasonable" opportunity to be heard will not turn solely on fact that a constitutionally protected interest is affected by government action, but, rather, nature of claimed procedural rights, extent of interference with private interests, and governmental interest all coalesce to define scope of due process.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Stanson v. San Diego Cost Regional Commission, 161 Cal.Rptr. 392, 101 C.A.3d 38.

Cal.App. 1979.  Notice which due process requires is notice which, according to common experience, should reasonably give notice of impending interference with ownership or right of possession.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Atkins v. Kessleer, 159 Cal.Rptr. 231, 97 C.A.3d 784.

Cal.App. 1979.  Right to a fair hearing is an essential of due process whether life, liberty or property is being taken by criminal or civil process.  West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7; U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  In re Watson, 154 Cal.Rptr. 151, 91 C.A.3d 455.

Cal.App. 1978.  Fundamental requirement of the concept of due process is the opportunity to be heard;' it is only under the most unusual circumstances that a person could even be temporarily deprived of his property without opportunity for a prior hearing.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  People v. Rath Packing Co., Inc., 149 Cal.Rptr. 431, 85 C.A.3d 308.

Cal.App. 1978.  Notice and an opportunity to be heard are the very essence of due process.  Hendricks v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 146 Cal.Rptr. 798. 81 C.A.3d 950.

Cal.App. 1978.  When the state is to deprive a citizen of a substantial right, adequate notice and hearing is synonymous with due process.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec.7.  Hughes v. Neth, 146 Cal.Rptr. 37, 80 C.A.3d 952.

Cal.App. 1977.  Essential ingredients of due process of law are notice and hearing.  People v. Surety Ins. Co., 143 Cal.Rptr. 47, 76 C.A.3d 57.

Cal.App. 1975.  Notice is fundamental to due process.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 7.  Taylor v. Madigan, 126 Cal.Rptr. 376, 53 C.A.3d 943.

Cal.App. 1975.  In determining whether procedure of governmental hearing affecting individual rights meets due process requirements, factors such as nature of right affected, degree of danger caused by proscribed condition or activity, and availability of prompt remedial measures must be considered.  Roth v. City of Los Angeles, 126 Cal.Rptr. 163, 53 C.A.3d 679.

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Cal.App. 1973.  a taking without notice or hearing is a deprivation of due process. U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Nork v. Superior Court In and For Sacramento County, 109 Cal.Rptr; 428, 33 C.A.3d 997.

Cal.App. 1973.  Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before an individual suffers governmental deprivation of a fundamental interest; entitlement to procedural protections depends upon extent to which "grievous loss" is threatened and requires court to weigh individual's interest in avoiding the loss against government interests in summary adjudication.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. C. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County. 106 Cal.Rprt. 123, 29 C.A.3d 909.

Opportunity for hearing must precede, not follow, deprivation of fundamental interest, except for extraordinary occasions  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. C. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County. 106 Cal.Rprt. 123, 29 C.A.3d 909.

In determining whether a status or right is fundamental in connection with requirement of guarantee of due process of law for notice and an opportunity to be heard, courts consider its effect in human terms and its importance to individual's life situation.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14. C. v. Superior Court for Sacramento County. 106 Cal.Rprt. 123, 29 C.A.3d 909.

Cal.App. 1971.  Procedural due process requires that, before person is deprived of his life, liberty, or property, he must be given notice of proceedings against him, he must be given opportunity to defend himself, and propriety of deprivation must be resolved in manner consistent with essential fairness.  West's Ann.Const. art. 1, Sec. 13; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Gray v. Whitmore, 94 Cal.Rptr. 904, 17 C.A.3d 1.

Cal.App.  1970.  Implicit notion of fairness and central to legal and social system, as respects due process, is idea that if interest being defended is of value, defendant ought to have his day in court and opportunity to be heard.  Mihans v. Municipal Court for Berkley-Albany Judicial Dist., Alameda County, 87 Cal.Rptr. 17, 7 C.A.3d 479.

Cal.App. 1970.  Fundamental due process requirements of fair and impartial hearing are reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard.  Baker v. Wadsworty, 85 Cal.Rptr. 880, 6 C.A.3d 253.

Cal.App. 1965.  Adequate notice is essential to procedural due process.  Application of Singh, 44 Cal.Rptr. 474, 234 C.A.2d 455.

Cal.App. 1953.  "Due process of law" means, broadly speaking, that before property of a person may be taken by the state, he must be given notice of the proceedings which may terminate in the taking, and be given opportunity to be heard.  People v. One 1950 Mercury Sedan, Engine No. 50LA40896M, 1950 License No. 29B9130, 254 P.2d 666, 116 C.A.2d 746.

RIGHTS, INTERESTS, BENEFITS, OR PRIVILEGES IN GENERAL

8A CalD 2d-395

C.A.9(Cal.) 1985.  Adequate or due process depends on nature of interest affected; the more important interest and greater effect of its impairment, the greater procedural safe guards state must provide to satisfy due process.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.  Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, certiorari denied Cranke v. Haygood, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 478 U.S. 1020, 92 L.Ed.2d 739.

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C.A.Cal. 1982.   Fundamental right may require strict scrutiny under due process clause. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14.  Halet v. Wend Inv. Co. 672 F.2d 1305.

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C.D.Cal. 1990.  When state puts person in danger, due process clause requires state to protect him to the extent that state's actions have put person at increased risk.  U.S.C.A.Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Talevich v. Voss, 734 F.Supp. 425.

E.D.Cal. 1986.  Defamation coupled with significant alteration in legal status justifies the invocation of procedural due process safeguards.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14.  Greene v Bowen, 639 F.Supp, 554, appeal dismissed and case remanded 844 F.2d 791. 

D.C.Cal. 1985.  Party claiming protection of due process clause must first demonstrate that the interest deprived was constitutionally protected and once it is determined that due process applies, question remains what process is due.  U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.  Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F.Supp. 305.

D.C.Cal 1985.  Determination of whether procedures provided for are constitutionally sufficient under due process requirements requires analysis of private interest affected by official action, governmental function involved, and probable value of any additional procedural safeguards.  U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.  U.S. v. Freitas, 602 F.Supp 1283.

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D.C.Cal. 1973.  To determine whether due process requirements apply, court must not look to the weight, but to the nature of the interest at stake.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.  Perkins v. Regents of University of California, 353 F.Supp. 618.

D.D.Cal. 1972.  To receive due process protection interests in dispute need not reach level of traditional constitutional "right."  U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.  Keller v. Kate Maremont Foundation, 365 F.Supp. 798, affirmed Geneva Towers Tenants Organization v. Federated Mortg. Investors, 504 F.2d 483.

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Procedural due process is not required only when some "vested right" is being impaired, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767, modified, cause remanded 497 F.2d 809, modified 510 F.2d 613, certiorari granted Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.Ct 2414, 421 U.S. 1010, 44 L.Ed.2d 678, reversed Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S.Ct 151, 425 U.S. 308, 47 L.Ed.2d 810, vacated, on remand 536 F.2d 305, on remand 471 F.Supp. 1113.

D.C.Cal. 1971.  Due process requires that government abide by basic principles of fairness when dispensing, or revoking, a privilege.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.  Hester v. Craven, 322 F.Supp. 1256.

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Cal.App. 2Dist. 1984.  Identification of dictates of state due process generally requires consideration of: private interests that will be affected by official actions; risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; dignitary interest in informing individual of nature, grounds and consequences of action and enabling them to present their side of story before responsible governmental official; and governmental interests, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.  West's Ann.Cal.Const. Art. 1, Sec.Sec. 7(a), 15.  Matter of Thomas, 206 Cal.Rptr. 719, 161 C.A.3d 721.

Cal.App. 1982. Due process to be afforded in given case depends upon private interests that will be affected by official actions; risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests that will be affected by official actions; risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests through procedures used, and probable value if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, government's interest, including function involved and fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.  U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.  Broussard v. Regents of University of California, 184 Cal.Rptr. 460, 131 C.A.3d 636.

Cal.App. 5Dist. 1984.  While state owes to each individual that process which, in light of the values of a free society, can be characterized as due, whether any procedural protections are due depends on extent to which the defendant will be condemned to suffer grievous loss.  U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 15.  People v. Hernandez, 206 Cal.Rptr. 843, 160 C.A.3d 725.

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