March 10, 2003 Verified Criminal Complaint Filed Before Sheriffs Shoot At Clive & Children - Court Refuses To Hear Complaint or TRO
The Court has consistenly refused to hear or consider this first action before the Sheriffs shot at Clive and his children. From a legal due-process perspective, nothing can be adjudicated untill this complaint and the TRO Clive filed on the morning of March 10, 2003 before the Sheriffs shot at Clive and his children are heard. And clearly Santa Cruz County lost any authority to hear any cases after thier Sheriffs attempted to murder Clive infront of his chldren as this is an automatic disqualifier for bias, it's like allowing a murderer to be the judge in his own trial.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ
TO ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and SEFFEN TICHATSCHKE IN AND FOR SANTA CRUZ_COUNTY AND/OR THEIR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on _________[date], at the hour of _________or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the courtroom of Department _________ of the above-entitled court, the defendant will move for an order DEMANDING THE FORMAL DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE SAMUEL STANDCLIFT STEVENS.
The motion will be made on the statutory grounds that to allow the already disqualified judge SAMUEL STANCLIFT STEVENS will prejudice this matter, and is in fact, prejudiced and biased, and it is factually impossible so as to deprive the plaintiff of the right to a fair and impartial trial and/or hearing as guaranteed and secured by the Constitution of California Article I, section 8 “due process of law” as well as by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution which impinge on the presumption of innocence and redress of grievance for your petitioner and plaintiff to defend his substantive rights at law.
The motion will be based on this notice of motion, on the memorandum of points and authorities served and filed herewith, on the records on file in this action, and on such oral and documentary evidence as may be presented at the hearing on the motion.
Comes now, the damaged and aggrieved party Clive Boustred, who comes before Almighty God and the above mentioned judicial powers tribunal, who hereby invokes true law and thereby deposes and says and proffer’s the following truth and facts in this Verified Criminal Complaint for contempt of an ORDER OF THE COURT of the above mentioned Superior Court in the above-entitled cause of action FL 16028..
COMES NOW THE PETITIONER Clive Boustred TO EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO THE CONTEMPT OF COURT against contemnors ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and STEFFEN TICHATSCHKE, who have in fact, been in direct insolence and arrogance to the ORDER OF THIS COURT.
DATED: March 10, 2003 ____________________________________
SEAL: Clive Boustred,
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ ]
] Affirmed: A True Bill
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ]
PARTIES TO THIS MATTER
1.) I am Clive Boustred, a white Christian male adult of the age of majority, who is not a fiction, nor a corporation. My status is as a free Christian male adult, sui juris, not embarrassed by the Fourteenth Amendment; a human being; a free man about the land with substantive authority; a California state Citizen, a taxpayer who has status before this judicial powers court, and was in the County Santa Cruz, in the State of California for all acts and/or omissions committed by said contemnors and thereby, comes before this courts lawful jurisdiction.
2.) I give up no rights, and reserve all of them. I am a free white Christian man living on the Land within Alameda County, in California, one of the United States of America; with express and explicit reservation of all Vested Natural, Inherent, Common Law, and Inalienable Rights, whether enumerated or not in the Constitution of the State of California of 1849; without admitting to any jurisdiction of the Constitution of the State of California of 1879; the Political Code, the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Penal Code of the State of California, each one though enacted in 1872 were never made a part of the Public Statutes of California, nor any amendments or additions of any type to any of the foregoing; without representation of any attorney-at- law, but with assistance of "counsel" by Right within the meaning of the Constitution of the State of California of 1849, Article I, Section 21.
Father has rights to the Custody of child in preference to Mother. Child need not join a Habeas Corpus brought by its parent to obtain its custody. Father cannot alienate his right to the Custody and control of his child. People ex rel Barry v. Mercien 3 Hill 399
“[The Father] is, in truth, the guardian by nature of his child…In England this power is exercised by the king as the Parens Patriae, acting through the court of chancery. De Manneville v. De Manneville, 10 Ves. 51, cases cited, and notes…
The discretion to be exercised is not an arbitrary one, but, in the absence of any positive disqualification of the father for the proper discharge of his parental duties, he has, as it seems to us, a paramount right to the custody of his infant child, which no court is at liberty to disregard. And while we are bound also to regard the permanent interests and welfare of the child, it is to be presumed that its interests and welfare will be best promoted by continuing that guardianship which the law has provided, until it is made plainly to appear that the father is no longer worthy of the trust. People v. Mercein, 25 Wend. 72. Herrick v. Richardson, 40 NH 272 (1860)
5.) Your petitioner, the greatly aggrieved and accused party in this matter, comes before this tribunal under exigent circumstances
6.) Richard Clive Boustred, age 7, 03/07/96 is in fact, my son; and is an unemancipated minor coming under my lawful protection and care as I as his father am his natural guardian appointed under law, and said son was in the County of Santa Cruz, in the State of California for all acts and/or omissions in this matter, and thereby comes under this courts lawful jurisdiction.
7.) William Frank Boustred, age 3, 01/21/00 is in fact, my son; and is an unemancipated minor coming under my lawful protection and care as I as his father am his natural guardian appointed under law, and said son was in the County of Santa Cruz, in the State of California for all acts and/or omissions in this matter, and thereby comes under this courts lawful jurisdiction.
8.) Contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, is acting feme sole, and is a women of ill repute, an adulterer, having unclean hands in this matter, a contemnor for all overt acts and/or omissions in this matter, who was in the County of Santa Cruz, was a resident therein, and thereby comes under this courts jurisdiction; and,
9.) Contemnor STEFFEN TICHATSCHKE, is a usurper, a man of disrepute, an adulterer who having unclean hands in this matter for all overt acts and/or omissions in this matter, who was in the County of Santa Cruz, was a resident therein, and thereby comes under this courts jurisdiction.
10.) I do in fact, have clean hands in this matter, while respondent’s in this matter against me, have unclean hands by their acts of fraud and their plan to damage me for the purposes of profit and reward. As I have clean hands in this matter, my claims to my own child of which I am holder in due course, and have lawful title of my children, that I am the preferred party not only by my status, but as a matter of both law and equity: "By the civil law, the child of parents divorced is to be brought up by the innocent party, at the expense of the guilty party." Ridley's View, part 1, ch. 3, sect. 9, cites 8th Collation. Vide, generally, 1 Blackstone's Comm. 440.
11.) Note: all laws contained herein are only brought as they are declaratory of the common law and the public law of this California Union State in consonance with the Constitution of California (1849).
12.) The “SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA CRUZ COUNTY” is a corporation, acting in both their personal and professional capacities, who was present for all acts and/or omissions committed against me within the County of Santa Cruz, and was a resident therein; clothed under public authority, and had knowledge of the law, as well as of the facts in this matter, and who wilfully with knowledge and premeditated intent did seek out in this matter in which to collude and conspire to disenfranchise me using “best interests of the child” doctrine as well as other frauds, under color of law, under color of authority, in which to implement enslavement and disenfranchisement against my person for the unlawful purposes of profit and reward, and thereby, comes under this courts jurisdiction for all acts and/or omissions in this matter;
13.) The COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ is a incorporated area within the STATE OF CALIFORNIA and is the landmass as defined under the Constitution of California 1849.
14.) The STATE OF CALIFORNIA is the incorporated landmass within the union of several States under the United States, and is the landmass whose boarders are defined therein under the Constitution of California 1849.
15.) Jurisdiction comes to the above mentioned judicial powers court as it is a fact, that the State of California is an inseparable part of the United States, and thereby, it is guaranteed a government Republican in Form under the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791), as enumerated under the Constitution of California Preamble and specified under Article VI, et seq. as well as Article III, Section 1.
FACTS GIVING RISE TO CONTEMPT OF DEFENDANTS
16.) On or about March 9, 2003, at approximately 10:40AM, I did in fact, meet with contemnor’s ANNAMARIA BOUSTRED as well as her co-conspirator STEFFAN TICHATSKE, and a resultant planned altercation ensued against me instituted against me through willful inadvertency, force, surprise, and stratagem by the willful conspired acts and/or omissions of said respondents in this matter.
17.) It is a fact, that judge Robert B. Atack of this same court and matter in case number FL-16028, did formally file a written ORDER In re the Marriage/Matter of Clive Boustred, petitioner against Anamaria Boustred, respondent. [SEE EXHIBIT ONE: “Recommendation re Custody and Visitation” dated July 12, 2002]
19.) It is a fact, that ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, had knowledge of this court order and did agree to same.
20.) It is a fact, that ANAMARIA BOUSTRED had knowledge of the facts in this matter.
21.) It is a fact, that said COURT ORDER issues under seal and by lawful signature of judge Robert B. Atack, did compel, and mandate and order the following orders which ANAMARIA BOUSTRED in overt collusion with contemnor and adulterer STEFFEN TICHATSCHKE did violate the following provisions of said ORDER:
Item 9. “Derogatory Remarks: Parents shall not make nor permit others to make derogatory remarks regarding the other parent or the other parents friends and loved ones to the child nor within the hearing range of the child.
Item 10. “Fighting: Parents shall not argue with, threaten, or insult one another nor allow others to argue with, threaten, or insult the other parent in the child’s presence.
Item 18. “Boyfriend: “The children shall have no contact with Steffan Tichatske.
August 13, 2002 STIPULATION RE: TEMPORARY CUSTODY AND VISITATION AND ORDER THEREON (Case No. FL 16028) Item:5. “Neither parent shall expose the children to romantic relationships for six months from the signing of this agreement. [SEE EXHIBIT TWO: TIMELINE, December 15th, 2002 entry] (Both children complained of meeting contemnor Steffen Tichatske.)
22.) It is a fact, that I did not precipitate nor fulminate this altercation noted in item 16 above.
23.) It is a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED in direct conspiracy with, and overt collusion with said contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE did wilfully and overtly plan this altercation in collusion with myself as noted in item number 16 above.
24.) It is also a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED has in fact, made innumerable false charges and/or allegations against me, in direct violation of law, and in bad faith to both me and the above-mentioned tribunal. She is not satisfied with the court findings and court orders which have issued in this matter, and seeks to overturn them by force, fraud, stratagem and surreptitious design.
25.) It is a fact, that this is a continued modus operandi of said respondent contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED.
26.) It is also a fact, that on or about March 9, 2003, at the Homewood Ski Resort, that said contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and myself did have a civil meeting between myself and our children at a planned ski-outing at Homewood, in the County of Placer, State of California.
a.) It is a fact, that no derogatory nor vituperative act and/or omission occurred nor was instigated by my person.
b.) It is a fact, that everything went smoothly between myself and respondent ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and was civil and polite during our planned meeting there.
c.) It is a fact, that everything went as planned UNTIL contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE did in fact, ski down before my wife and children, within plain view to both me and my children—and did in fact, insolently, with a planned intent to violate both good sense, reasonableness, good morals and justice—did violate said Court Order so established and agreed upon and did place my children in direct jeopardy of bad faith actions and/or acts and/or omissions, with no palpable regards to morals or decency.
27.) Seeing my children in such direct jeopardy and in overt insolence and disregards to said court order, I did in fact, rush to protect them, in accordance with the concise rule of law, which was just and reasonable. I did in fact, say directly to contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE (without aggression) “Please leave.”
28.) It is a fact, he did respond: “No, I am not going to leave.”
29.) It is a fact, that was in direct contempt of said court order so established by this court.
30.) I did in fact, respond: “There is a clear court order barring you from access to my children, please leave.”
31.) It is a fact, that he, even though he had knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, did not leave, and he then did willfully assault me, rushing forwards within 12 inches from my face, and with great aggression and taunting said: “I’m not leaving.”
32.) Said contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE was in my personal space, and I gave clear indication I was uncomfortable—but at that instant—upon no fault of my own; an altercation did ensue of which I did not retreat, and when it was over—did not pursue him, but rather simply left for the safety of my children.
33.) It is a fact, my children were two yards away—right in front of my youngest boy William.
34.) This did put me in direct ridicule in front of my own sons---and I was in fact, under threat, and felt great fear and apprehension.
35.) It is a fact, that my wife did in fact, go off to call what appeared to be a set up—officials from the resort Homewood who were waiting there.
36.) It is a fact, that we were on the KIDS SLOPE—and the chances of all five (5) officials from Homewood being there—is an impossibility.
37.) Within moments, there was five (5) Homewood officials there, who did attempt to prevent me from leavingagainst the better interests of my children.
38.) I did in fact, remove my children from harms way in accordance with my rights as my children’s natural guardian appointed by law and in their better interest:
“Where a father is entitled to the possession of his minor child as against all the world except its mother, and where the father and mother are equally entitled to its possession, he does not commit the crime of kidnapping by taking possession of it.” State v. Dewey, 155 Iowa, 469, 136 N. W. 533, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 478; Commonwealth v. Myers, 146 Pa. 24, 23 A. 164; Hunt v. Hunt, 94 Ga. 257, 21 S. E. 515; People v. Congdon, 77 Mich. 351, 43 N. W. 986. State v. Elliott, 131 So. 28, 171 La. 306, 77 A.L.R. 314
39.) Both contemnors had knowledge of the law as well as the facts of this matter, and knew that they were taunting me by fighting words and placing me under threat, ridicule in front of my own sons would force me to illicit a response in defense of my self in front of my own children.
40.) I WANT IT JUDICIALLY NOTED AND PLACED ON THE RECORD, THAT IF CONTEMNOR STEPHEN TICHATSKE DID NOT ARRIVE AS THEY PLANNED, THEN; NONE OF THIS WOULD HAVE FACTUALLY OCCURRED.
41.) I also want it judicially noted and placed on the record, that this alleged and I believe planned act and/or omission by her, is in fact, the fourth (4th) time contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED has attempted to have me arrested, or charged by police and/or other authorities by filing false and/or malicious complaints.
a.) Please reference [EXHBIT THREE: 911 Call Affidavit]
b.) She agreed that I could take the children Friday afternoon on or about December 15, 2002, she then refused to let me take the children and she instead took off with my son William Frank Boustred in direct violation of my authority and against our agreement, leaving my son Richard Clive Boustred at his school. I waited there for the whole afternoon, and she eventually returned at Six PM, with my son William, and my son William did complain to me that she went to the police. [SEE EXHIBIT TWO—Timelines] (She told me that “The police wouldn’t come this time, but they would come next time.”)
42.) On or about Saturday, February 22, 2002, when exchanging the children at K-Mart in Capitola, my son Richard complained to me earlier that she was going to take him on the ferry with contemnor Tichatschke. When I asked her if she was going to take the boys in front of Tichatschke she first refused to answer anything, then she said she had a right, in direct insolence and disregard to said court order refusing same under Item 18. prohibitions noted above. She then attempted to forcibly remove my son Richard from my car, and he withdrew frightened that she would in fact, remove him from the car—and I went and collected my son William from her car and put him in my car and drove home where I did in fact, write a report. I did call her as I was writing, and found she was at the Capitola Police Department, talking to OFFICER BRIAN DODD, Summit Community Deputy, (831-454-2440). I spoke to Deputy Dodd and discussed the issues, Deputy Dodd handed the phone to my wife, I heard her start shouting at me on the phone, she cut me off while she was still shouting at me. It appeared that she was purposefully giving Deputy Dodd a ‘show’ of the nature I had seen before were she expressed all her emotions while telling lies. I tried to call Deputy Dodd’s back, but I was unable to connect with him. I left a request for him to call me back. I did not receive a call back from Deputy Dodd. I want it judicially noted and on the record, that I have never gone to the any Police and asked them to “arrest” her. It is clear by the fact, that contemnor respondent ANAMARIE BOUSTRED has had an ongoing hidden agenda, to attempt to have me arrested.
43.) I want it judicially noted and on the record, that contemnors have engaged in an overt enterprise in an continuing pattern in placing forwards false allegations against me in a scheme to gain control over my property, as well as my children; and they are engaged in a transfer of wealth scheme in which to provide her with financial remunerations she is not entitled to by the concise rule of law.
44.) It is a fact, that on or about July 9th, 2002, (the next night) that my son Richard, due to the direct acts and/or omission of said contemnor respondent ANAMARIE BOUSTRED in attempting to call 911 to frame me for arrest, my son suffered so much stress during that event, that I had to factually take him to Emergency Room with a severe ear ache and other stress induced complications.
45.) It is a fact, that I have continually acted in good faith with no bad faith to respondent’s in this matter, that I have continually offered her an olive branch to open a dialogue and continued access, care, custody and sharing of our children, to which she has acted in bad faith and in direct contempt of same. It is a fact:
a.) On or about November 2002, I did in fact, allow my wife at her request to have an “extra night” with the children, which I did grant and allow, in exchange for me picking up my sons early on Fridays which was agreeable to all, and great benefit to her.
b.) In addition, to any request she has made to change dates on the weekends—I have cooperated with her completely.
c.) I want it judicially noted and on the record, that the weekend in question, was in fact, of this category where at contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED request, I did allow her to take care of my son’s on Thursday night, so that she could see my son Richard on Friday morning so she could see him on his birthday.
d.) For these good faith, and gracious acts extended by me, I was met with planned treason in an overt conspiracy to set me up for the issue now at hand.
46.) COUNT 1: CONTEMPT OF COURT--Violation of California Penal Code 166(a)(4)
That on or about March 9, 2003, contemnors ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and STEFFAN TICHATSKE did knowingly, and willfully, with overt malice, violate a known valid court order in direct violation of the law.
47.) COUNT 2: CONSPIRACY-- VIOLATION OF PENAL CODE § 182 et seq.—A FELONY, 1 YEAR JAIL; $10,000 FINE
That on or about March 9, 2003, contemnors ANAMARIA BOUSTRED and STEFFAN TICHATSKE did with full knowledge, conspire and collude to commit the acts and/or omissions at the Homewood Ski Resort which did lead to acts and/or omissions of assault and battery against me, and that they did plan this and that it did culminate in the direct damage to me and my person, by overt design in an ongoing enterprise to disenfranchise me, and as a transfer of wealth scheme in collusion to have me arrested in violation of my substantive rights or due process of law, without any protections thereto.
48.) COUNT 3: OVERT ACT— Penal Code § 182
Said contemnors along with their attorney, did jointly conspire and have done same in the past as proffered in the evidence so submitted upon the record to commit the overt acts and/or omissions in an ongoing enterprise established between them for the purposes for profit and reward, in order to divest me of my substantive rights during a time of divorce and/or separation from my wife contemnor ANAMARIE BOUSTRED.
49.) COUNT 4: ASSAULT— Penal Code § 240, § 241 [Fine $2,000 and 1 Year Jail]
On or about March 9, 2003, contemnors ANAMARIE BOUSTRED, in joint collusion and conspiracy with contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE, did make an unlawful attempt to commit violent injury upon me at Homewood Ski Resort in the County of Placerville, State of California.
50.) COUNT 5: BATTERY--- California Penal Code § 242, § 243 [$2,000 and 6 months jail]
On or about March 9, 2003, contemnors ANAMARIE BOUSTRED, in joint collusion and conspiracy with contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE, did commit the unlawful action of an offensive touching against my person, at the Homewood Ski Resort, in the County of Placerville, in the State of California.
51.) COUNT 6: OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE--PENAL CODE § 96, 96.5, ART. I, § 15 CAL. CONST.—A FELONY and PC § 98:
That for the ongoing time period of July 12, 2002 to the present, said contemnor defendants in direct overt collusion did in fact, obstruct and frustrate any attempts of me obtaining any fairness, justice or protection of my substantive rights and rights to due process of law filed and lawfully served upon all parties in this matter and did in fact wilfully with malice and aforethought; disenfranchise me, and aid defendant in her overt and ongoing acts of Parental Alienation of my own children from me, and place both me and my children in continued jeopardy by using the SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, for a purpose that was never intended at law, without cause a direct violation of Constitution of California, Article I, Section 1 AND an overt violation of the concise rule of law and any decency or caring towards me or my sons, and a direct violation of my rights, and the rights of THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
"A democratic society, in which respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards against the misuse of the law enforcement process. Zeal in tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment. Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the cannot be entrusted to a single functionary. The complicated process of criminal Justice is therefore divided into different parts, responsibility for which is separately vested in the various participants upon whom the relies for its vindication." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943).
52.) Title 18 USC ' 1510. Obstruction of criminal investigation.
(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "criminal investigator" means any individual duly authorized by a department, agency, or armed force of the United States to conduct or engage in investigations of or prosecutions for violations of the criminal laws of the United States.
On or about March 9, 2003, contemnors did in fact, falsely charge me with as to yet to be disclosed acts and/or omissions of which I am not, nor ever had been guilty, and of which they did in fact, had an ongoing enterprise to commit, in direct violation of the concise rule of law.
53.) COUNT 7: PERJURY—California Penal Code § 118, § 126—Imprisonment in the State Prison for Four Years.
That on or about March 9, 2003, said contemnors did conspire to by force and stratagem, effect an altercation between me and contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE, after which, they had schemed to have Homewood employees and officials to be present to “manage” and conveniently “witness” said altercation which contemnor defendants did conspire to instigate in direct violation of established court order. That after they did so, that they did knowing that any allegations against me were false, they did file unknown charges against me with full knowledge that said acts and/or omissions were caused by them, and were under and by their design.
54.) That said contemnor defendants knew and had substantial knowledge of the facts of this matter and knew they were committing egregious damages and offenses against me and my children.
55.) It is a fact, that said contemnors on the dates mentioned, for each act and/or omission presented; did have a mens rea, a guilty mind, and as I have clearly shown, did fully intend and plan to commit the above mentioned acts and/or omissions in direct violation of the law.
56.) It is a fact, that said contemnors on the dates mentioned, for each act and/or omission presented; did in fact, commit an actus reus, and did do the acts aforementioned in direct arrogance to the concise rule of law.
57.) It is a fact, that said contemnors on the dates mentioned, for each act and/or omission presented; did in fact commit the corpus delecti, and did harm me, and damage both me and my children, in direct violation of the law for their own reasons for profit and reward as well as other remunerations and/or scams and/or schemes.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
58.) I have a substantive right under the Constitution of California, Article I, Section 8, for substantive due process of law.
"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional mandate may not be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily promote in some respects the best interest of the public." (Slote v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367,; 9 NE 2D 12; 112 ALR 660) Or, that "The State and its municipalities are prohibited from violating substantive rights." (Owen v. City 445 U.S. 622 1980) "A conspiracy is actionable under U.S.C. 1985, when there has been an actual denial of due process." (Jennings v. Nester, 217 F2d 153, cert. denied 349 U.S. 958, 99 L.Ed.2d. 1281, 75 S.CT 888, U.S. CT App, 7th Cir Ill.)
59.) I have a substantive right to file this VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT against contemnors, and the District Attorney as well as the above-mentioned judicial powers court is in fact, obligated to provide me with redress of grievances.
Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806; 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2526, 2541 n.46 (1975)
this is a controlling case in a citizen's right to represent himself, and the right to also have appointment of stand-by counsel to aid and assist if and/or when (a) the accused requests help &.or (b) in the event of termination of self-representation. Id. 2541 n. 14. (see U. S. v. Dougherty 43 F.2d 1113, 1124-26)
Sanders v. United States 373 U.S. 1; 83 S.Ct.1068 (1963) ensuring the constitutional right to a fair and thorough hearing of petitioner's claims, due to the adversarial nature of the proceeding.
"Here we interpret the California Penal and Government Codes to authorize the district attorney to present or lay a complaint before a magistrate as to a possible felony, but not to exclude or prohibit the same act when performed by a private citizen. And see Western Surgical Supply Co. v. Affleck, 1952, 110 Cal.App.2d 388, at page 392, 242 P.2d 929, at page 931, where it is said of a then existing Penal Code Section:
"The section *fn4 does not restrict the making of a complaint to any certain person or individual; it may be by anyone having knowledge of the offense charged." Cf. People v. Currie, 1911, 16 Cal.App. 731, 117 P. 941. [SEE Johnson v. MacCoy, (1960) 278 F.2d 37]
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). The hearing must be "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. E. g., ICC v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1913); Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103-104 (1963).
60.) Your petitioner and complainant, has a right and perfect right to file this verified criminal complaint for lawful adjudication. It is a fact, that published California Penal Code § 806 states:
A proceeding for the examination before a magistrate of a person on a charge of *** a felony must be commenced by written complaint under oath subscribed by the complainant and filed with the magistrate. Such complaint may be verified on information and belief. When the complaint is used as a pleading to which the defendant pleads guilty under Section 859(a) of this code, the complaint shall contain the same allegations, including the charge of prior conviction or convictions and, wherever applicable, shall be construed and shall have substantially the same effected as provided in this code for indictments and informations.
Further, that same code § 849 is clear and concise as to your duties in this matter (pertinent part):
§ 849: Arrest without warrant; duty to take prisoner before magistrate and file complaint; release from custody
“(a) When an arrest is made without a warrant by a peace officer, or a private person…and a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid before such magistrate.”
Arrests by private persons. A private person may arrest another:
1.) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence.
2.) When the person arrested has committed a felony.
3.) When a felony has been in fact committed and he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
61.) Any failure to act on this verified criminal complaint will be a direct violation of law and a direct substantive damage to me. As taken from footnote 31 from BRISCOE v. LaHUE, 460 U.S. 325, 365 demonstrating that Congress, when enacting the Civil Rights legislation was hostile to the considerable CORRUPTION of the Judiciary and the Legal system:
See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 78 (Rep. Perry) ("Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses conceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices"); id., at 394 (Rep. Rainey) ("[T]he courts are in many instances under the control of those who are wholly inimical to the impartial administration of law and equity"); id., at App. 186 (Rep. Platt) (judges exercise their "almost despotic powers . . . against Republicans without regard to law or justice"); id., at App. 277 (Rep. Porter) ("The outrages committed upon loyal men there are under the forms of law. It can be summed up in one word: loyal men cannot obtain justice in the courts . . ."); id., at 429 (referring to "prejudiced juries and bribed judges"). See, BRISCOE v. LaHUE, 460 U.S. 325, 365-366;
62.) Please also be under judicial notice of all government persons under oath and affirmation:
CCP $ 446: “Subscriptions of pleadings; necessity of verification; affidavit of party; who may verify; verification by attorney or by officer of corporation or agency; affidavit; assertion of truth under penalty of perjury. '"Every pleading must be subscripted by the party or his or her attorney. When the state, any county thereof, city, school district, public agency, or public corporation, or any officer of the state, of any county thereof, city, school district, district, public agency, or plaintiff, the answer shall be verified unless an admission of the truth of the complaint might subject the party to a criminal prosecution, or unless a county thereof, city, school district, district, public agency, or public corporation in his or her official capacity is defendant. When the complaint is verified, the answer shall be verified. IN all cases of a verification of a pleading, the affidavit of the party shall state that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated on his or her information or belief, and as to those matters that he or she believes to be true; and where a pleading is verified, it shall be by the affidavit of a party, unless the parties are absent from the county where the attorney has his or her office, or from some cause unable to verify it, or the facts are within the knowledge of his or her attorney or other person verifying the same.”
63.) Contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, did in fact, commit fraud upon me in continually violating, ignoring and being insolent to a known court order.
NEAL v. SUPERIOR COURT (NEAL) (06/22/01 - No. G028185)
Breach of contract action alleging spouse did not comply with the terms of a family law judgment and alleging spouse committed fraud in family court proceedings belongs in family court that issued original judgment and not in civil court.
64.) The right to use force is secured under law in such circumstances of which I was forced to suffer:
Justification does not make a criminal use of force lawful; if the use of force is justified, it cannot be criminal at all. ...
The defense of justification (NY Penal Law art. 35) affirmatively permits the use of force under certain circumstances (see, People v. Watts, 57 N.Y.2d 299, 301, 456 N.Y.S.2d 677, 442 N.E.2d 1188; see also, Hechtman, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law § 35.15, p. 93  ). ... The defense does not operate to excuse a criminal act, nor does it negate a particular element of a crime. Rather, by recognizing the use of force to be privileged under certain circumstances, it renders such conduct entirely lawful (see, People v. Taylor, 177 N.Y. 237, 245, 69 N.E. 534). ...
In this regard, the current statutory defense reflects the common-law "right" of an individual to repel a threat ....
Defense [was] deemed a natural, inalienable right at common law. ... If the conduct is justified, it simply cannot be the basis of ... any .. crime.
People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541, 496 N.E.2d 202, 505 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1986).
65.) It is a fact, that contemnor Steffan Tichatske did use “fighting words” against me and did invade and assault me without my provocation during his overt criminal acts and/or omissions in front of me and my children in direct violation of law, and did overtly conspire to commit these wilful acts against me, using inadvertency, surprise and prior planning:
Legal definition of 'fighting words'
Fighting words doctrine. The First Amendment doctrine that holds that certain utterances are not constitutionally protected as free speech if they are inherently likely to provoke a violent response from the audience. N.A.A.C.P. v. Clairborne Hardware Co., Miss., 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). Words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, having direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, remark is addressed. The test is what persons of common intelligence would understand to be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. City of Seattle v. Camby, 104 Wash.2d 49, 701 P.2d 499, 500.
The "freedom of speech" protected by the Constitution is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances and there are well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which does not raise any constitutional problem, including the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting words" which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031.
SOURCE: Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court upheld for the first and only time a conviction for fighting words and made that doctrine a rare exception to the First Amendment's protection of free speech. Walter Chaplinsky, a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, called a city marshal a "damned Fascist" and "a God damned racketeer." He was convicted of violating a New Hampshire law that declared, "No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place." In affirming the state court, the Supreme Court announced that the First Amendment does not protect "insulting or 'fighting' words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."
66.) This court cannot discriminate on the well-being of my children, only because their parents are undergoing a divorce. This court must rise above the mundane politically correct feminist criteria it has followed and misguidedly implemented over the past years with disastrous effects and must allow my children the same right of protection that I as their father can afford them as any married couples children who have the right to their own fathers sage care, custody, guidance and protection:
“It was most accurately put by The U.S. Supreme Court in Clark vs. Jeter [Citations Omitted] in 1988...."Established in a UNANIMOUS ruling that it was UNCONSTITUTIONAL to treat a non marital child in a way that was inferior to a marital child......The Supreme court said "Time out you can't do that you cannot DISCRIMINATE against non-marital children. THEY HAVE GOT EVERY BIT AS MUCH RIGHT TO THOSE TWO PARENTS THAT THEY WERE BORN WITH AS A MARITAL CHILD.....So as a constitutional matter, we would be very hard pressed to discriminate against the non-marital child. I would go further and put it into pragmatic terms. Most of the children who were born into a non-marital situation are not the result of one night stands. These are parents who have known one another other a long time. They have go a relationship in the majority of cases actually living together, they are involved, both of them, with respect to the child. Why in the world would we have a law that presumes one of the parents is uninvolved.”
67.) This VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT is true and proper and is a true bill, and is actionable under the concise rule of law.
68.) Contemnor’s are in fact, using the courts system, along with the police and all their surrogate “Family Court” systems, for a purpose not intended at law, to divest me of my rights, and to treat me as devoid of my substantive rights and justice, in direct violation of law:
"Once a father who is separated or divorced from a mother and is no longer living with his child...could not be treated differently from a currently married father living with his child." Quilloin v. Walcott, 99 S.Ct. 549, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56, (1978)
69.) Contemnor’s, along with their surrogate court systems, are engaged in collusion in a continuing pattern of “making a fraudulent record” in which to overcome contemnor’s unclean hands, and acts of contempt of court.
United States v. Russell (1973) 411 U.S. 423, 431-436, 36 L.Ed. 2d 366, 93 S.Ct. 1637 the Supreme Court noted: "Conduct of Law Enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking the judicial process to obtain a conviction" "California cases have treated this defense as viable." (People v. Thoi (1989 4th Dist) 213 Cal.App. 3d 689, 696, 261 Cal.Rptr. 789.
70.) It is a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, has unclean hands in this matter, and thereby, cannot make a valid claim against me, in violation of an already established court order, and in light of her past actions and overt immoralities.
The doctrine [of unclean hands] promotes justice by making a [petitioner] answer for his own misconduct in the action. It prevents "a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression." [Petitioner] must come into court with clean hands, and keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (E. & J. Gallo Winery) (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970.
71.) An INJUNCTION is the lawful and reasonable remedy in this matter as I have no clear and available remedy against respondent’s in this matter in their constant allegations being made against me for their own altruistic purposes, which do not comport with the concise rule of law:
The county judge, in granting an injunction, acts in the place of the district judge, and therefore the latter may dissolve the injunction as if granted by himself. Custom Digest (212K164) Borland v. Thornton, 12 Cal. 440 (Cal.,1859)
Husband's harm was not monetary, but rather an injustice comparable to a "false imprisonment" - defined as "the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another." Penal Code 236 - Civil same. "It is immaterial that the deprivation may be temporary and nonfinal." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
72.) It is a fact, that contemnor and her surrogate court systems, along with other state actors and/or agents and/or agencies, have shown a propensity to have a clear conflict of interest and are not disinterested parties in submitting any complaint and/or warrant against me, as the proofs so submitted by exhibit here along with sworn affidavit succinctly prove respondent’s unclean hands and a continued “agenda” to grind an axe against me. Thereby, contemnors, by their clearly proven hidden agenda to keep pushing this private civil matter, into another venue in which to denigrate my position as the main natural guardian of my children as per court order established under FL 16028 STIPULATION RE: TEMPROARY CUSTODY AND VISITATION AND ORDER THEREON, thereby, it is a fact, that I cannot be under “legal commitment” or under any warrant, until this matter is heard in accordance with the substantive proofs and injunctive relief so prayed for.
More to the present point, a prosecutor may have a conflict if institutional arrangements link the prosecutor too closely to a private party, for example a victim, who in turn has a personal interest in the defendant's prosecution and conviction. As Judge Friendly put it in Wright v. United States, (supra) , 732 F.2d at page 1056, a prosecutor "is not disinterested if he has, or is under the influence of others who have, an axe to grind against the defendant." (Italics added.) The tie that binds the prosecutor to an interested person may be compelling though it derives from the prosecutor's institutional objectives or obligations. Thus, in Young v. U.S. ex rel . Vuitton et Fils S. A. (1987) 481 U.S. 787 [95 L. Ed. 2d 740, 107 S. Ct. 2124], the high court, pursuant to its supervisory authority, forbade a private law firm from prosecuting a contempt proceeding on behalf of the Government, because the firm, as a matter of legal ethics, bore the "obligation of undivided loyalty" to its private client, Vuitton, which in turn had a private pecuniary interest in the prosecution. ( Id. at p. 805 [95 L. Ed. 2d at p. 757].) A public prosecutor must not be in a position of "attempting at once to serve two masters," the People at large and a private person or entity with its own particular interests in the prosecution. ( Ganger v. Peyton (4th Cir. 1967) 379 F.2d 709, 714.) *fn8 Private influence, exercised through control over the prosecutor's personal or institutional concerns, is a conflict of interest, under section 1424, if it creates a reasonable possibility the prosecutor may not act in an evenhanded manner.
As the majority holds, the trial court correctly found that the prosecutor suffered a "conflict of interest" under Penal Code section 1424--i.e., there was "a reasonable possibility that the [district attorney's] office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner" ( People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 141, 148 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5] [construing Pen. Code, § 1424].)
In Greer we suggested that "if the trial court determines that a district attorney's participation in the filing of a criminal complaint or the preliminary hearing on that complaint created a potential for bias or the appearance of a conflict of interest, it may conclude that the defendant was not 'legally committed' within the meaning of Penal Code section 995, and the information should be set aside." (Greer, (supra) , 19 Cal. 3d at p. 263, fn. 5.) We expressly reserve the question whether availability of a remedy under section 995 was affected by the addition of section 1424 and thus express no opinion here regarding what standard would govern motions brought under section 995.
The district attorney is an executive officer exercising executive branch authority and generally is not subject to judicial supervision. (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134.) A court does not have the authority to direct the executive's choice of a representative, but may disqualify a particular representative when his or her participation would taint the proceeding. (People v. Superior Court (Greer) (1977) 19 Cal.3d 255, 265.) In this respect, the Legislature has provided that a motion to disqualify may not be granted unless the evidence establishes a conflict of interest sufficient to render it unlikely that the defendant will receive a fair trial. (Pen. Code, § 1424, subd. (a)(1).)
People v. Eubanks, 14 Cal.4th 1282, 14 Cal.4th 580, 927 P.2d 310, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 (Cal. 12/23/1996)
73.) It is a fact, that my children are suffering, due to her capricious acts, surreptitious designs and stratagems, which calls into question the competency of contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED ability to mother and nurture my children.
"The simple fact of being a mother does not, by itself, indicate a willingness or capacity to render a quality of care different than that which a father can provide," the court said. State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285.
76.) Jury trial is demanded in this matter, coming under the CRIMINAL venue and jurisdiction of the above mentioned judicial powers court:
"Since the right to recover possession of real property was a right ascertained and protected at Common Law. The 7th Amendment of the Constitution entitles either party to demand a jury Trial in an action to recover possession of real property in the S.C. for the Dist. of Col. under 16-1501 of D.C. code."
77.) I want it judicially noted and placed on the record, that “IF” the above-mentioned County of Santa Cruz courts would uphold the concise rule of law, and their own court orders, and would not conspire with, and allow such a frivolous avenue to access the courts for any conspired conflagration in their design and or artifice for attentions and claims against me continually instituted by said respondents, with full knowledge that said courts would act in their special interests as their surrogate lawyer and/or court---and if same court would uphold the integrity of their own court orders and hold said vexatious respondents to the concise rule of law and agreements and/or contracts and/or stipulations and/or their own court orders; then these continued, sustained acts of barratry would not continuously occur against me, and no further suits, complaints, nor filings would be instituted by said respondents, whom have a sustained, palpable and continued record in filing such false and/or fraudulent allegations against your petitioner in this matter.
78.) No conviction can legally issue in this matter:
Padreuita v. Lake Worth 367 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1979) conviction obtained by fraud or perjury or other corrupt means is basis for malicious prosecution.
79.) Any and all state actor, agents, and/or agencies who in fact, file any matter against me in relation to this matter does in fact, give up all rights and claims to immunity, and will have no remedy at law for any future action I may take against them:
“IMMUNITY NOT AVAILABLE See Milstein v. Cooley, supra at 257 F. 3d 1001:
“(ii) Filing a False Crime Report" Filing a crime report as a complaining witness or crime victim is analogous to filing an affidavit or oath in support of an arrest warrant, see Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31, 118 S. Ct. 502; Morley, 175 F. 3d at 760.
80.) Thereby, neither respondents’ nor any state actor, agent and/or agency may contrive a conviction against me, until this matter is heard before a jury trial:
Mooney v. Holohan 294 U.S. 103; 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935) cannot contrive a conviction by the obfuscation of relevant facts.
81.) It is a fact, that respondent’s are acting with malice against me as well as my sons:
Central Machinery v. Williams 424 So.2d 201 (2nd DCA 1983) malice is shown in commencement or contrivance of prosecution
82.) It is clear and concise, that THERE IS A PALPABLE PATTERN OF VEXATIOUS LITIGATION INVENTING CRISIS’S IN WHICH TO CHANGE THE POWER STRUCTURE WHICH WAS SAGELY ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT UNDER FL 15 AS WELL AS FL 16028 OF WHICH RESPONDENT’S ARE CLEARLY DISSATISFIED AND THEREBY ARE SEEING BY DESIGN TO UNDERMINE:
Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. at 269 evidence of a trait, habit or pattern of the witness similar to the facts at bar is relevant and therefore admissible and cannot be withheld by the prosecution or concealed from the jury.
83.) It is a fact, that contemnor Steffan T has been formally barred from my son’s school by the Administrative Pastor Mark Spurlock because of his continued acts and/or omissions and immorality, of which Twin Lakes Church School, located at 2701 Cabrillo College Drive, Aptos, California, County of Santa Cruz refuses to have any part of.
84.) It is also a fact, that my sons, are flourishing in our home located at 210 Suncrest Drive, Soquel, California, County of Santa Cruz. They have a good and wholesome and proper home, guidance and moral upbringing, and are not in any danger nor will suffer any harm in any way from me.
85.) It is a fact, as proffered throughout the evidence so submitted under subscription and verification of the truth, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED’s, continued designs artifice and stratagem, are placing my children under palpable fear and danger, and such subterfuge and fulminations are not healthy nor conducive to my children’s safety, security or growth. These continued abuses, are a criminal intrusion into the sanctity of our home, and a direct and exigent danger to same. My son’s stability is the palpable issue here—and under the clean hands doctrine, the weight of crimes and bad faith acts and/or omissions in this matter by respondents is clearly demonstrated by the substantive record so submitted into evidence of which this court is compelled to act on our behalf in defense of our rights.
86.) It is also a fact, and I want this court to judicially note and place on the record the fact, that if this court denies said respondents access to its court to continue said designs and subterfuge and stratagems—then; upon closure of the above courts forum to hear said respondents incessant vexatious claims, no further litigation will issue in this matter upon abrogation of this courts open recourse to respondents, and thereby, upon this fact, litigation will all but be eradicated in this matter, which has to be recognized by this court during a time of this states grave fiscal crisis.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
87.) Your petitioner, the accused and aggrieved party in this matter comes now before Almighty God and this judicial powers court and supplicates the following prayer for relief:
88.) That an immediate INJUNCTION issue against said respondent’s against any and all claim or criminal filing against me until this VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT is lawfully heard before a jury of my peers by trial by jury.
89.) That a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER be issued against contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED to prohibit her from seeing both my sons, as doing so will endanger them both morally, and also place them in direct jeopardy of any artifice or design she may intend to place as a trap against me, thereby continually exposing my son to immorality, police, and continual filing of needless charges against me; of which I, as well as they, now have a direct fear of; and, is a needless danger to our lives and safety; and,
90.) That an immediate TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER also issue against contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE who is acting in direct collusion with said contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED, and who I am in direct palpable fear and in danger of; and,
91.) That this VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT issue, and be palpably acted upon in a timely manner under the concise rule of law.
92.) That no other order, or requirement, or stipulation or ruling will go forwards in this matter if and until this matter goes to trial by jury, and a decision is made therein; and,
93.) This court remit or provide to me any further justice and/or relief that it deems just and/or proper in this matter.
Dated: March 10, 2003 _________________________________
Clive Boustred, -- AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
A Free Man, Sovereign, Constitutional Rights Intact
210 Suncrest Dr.
Soquel, CA 95073
+1 (408) 889-4351
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ
I, Clive Boustred, declare that:
1. I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled matter.
2. I am in fact, in propria personal sui juris.
3. I represent that the facts and truths expressed in my Memorandum of Points and Authorities are true and correct and sincerely held as they are in fact the truth of this matter.
4. That I have personal knowledge of the facts in this matter, that I have read the contents of this document in the above entitled cause of action, and know and understand them to be true.
5. On or about 10:40 am I arrived at Homewood Ski Resort, County of Placerville in the State of California. I met my wife who was alone at the time just below the learning/kids ski slope, there were no un-pleasantries at the meeting and I prepared Richard with his snowboard and helped him get going. My wife and I discussed the day that she would look after the boys and that I would go snowboarding, and that at around 2:30 I would come and get Richard to take him up the mountain to ski the beginner slopes. My wife and William then started walking up the beginner ski slope where Richard was snowboarding.
As my wife reached half way up the slope, Tichatschke in what appeared to be a planned meeting skied down and kissed her in front of my boys. He then started taking pictures of my boys. I rode the ski lift up and traversed across to Tichatschke and asked him to please leave. He refused I informed him that there was a clear court order baring him from contact with my boys. He sneered at me and refused to leave, pushing his face towards mine in a clear challenge and without any regard to William who was sitting about two paces away. A scuffle ensued and Anamaria then ran off. The attendant of the kids lift approached us and asked us to stop, I agreed with him and picked up William and removed him from the scene. Richard was already at the bottom of the hill. I put both of them in my car to remove them from the situation. Within moments five Homewood officials were there insisting that I do not leave. In told them that my wife had previously tried to have me arrested and that the stress it caused my son ended him up in the emergency room. I told the Homewood official that I was going to act in the children’s interest and I left. Another Homewood employee closed the parking lot gate on me as I was leaving, I had to get out and open the gate and I left. Once away from the commotion, I stopped and took care of my boys who were naturally shaken from the situation. Both boys expresses extreme distain for Tichatschke. I then took my boys to Burger King in Tahoe for lunch and drove home stopping a number of times along the way to take care of the boys.
On arriving at home I took care of the boys and after tucking them in bet I worked through the night preparing a contempt filing as I must protect these poor little chaps.
6. That I do believe I was set up, and this whole escapade on the date aforementioned in this matter, was done for altruistic purposes to give her the upper hand in a custody and property issue where she is in fact, the guilty party with unclean hands.
7. That I also believe that her attorney, Vicki Parry, has counseled said contemnor respondent(s) to create and fulminate events which will give her client the ability to file continued suits and/or actions against me to harass both me and my sons’ in which to create havoc in our lives.
8. That it is a fact, that contemnor ANAMARIA BOUSTRED did have an adulterous affair with contemnor Steffen Tichatschke on or about January or February 2002 and continuing on that point onwards, to the direct damage of me and my sons, as well as my family.
9. That said ANAMARIA BOUSTRED as well as contemnor STEFFAN TICHATSKE were in fact, under legal obligation to me.
10. That said contemnors were in fact they were under factual contract and obligation to me not to lie and to live in accordance to the concise rule of law, under the moral precepts and obligations as so stated within the Holy Bible with complete integrity.
11. It is a fact, that said contemnors do now cohabit together at 3320 Fairway Drive, Soquel, CA 95073 to the great humiliation and shame of my sons, and our family.
Dated: March 10th, 2003 _________________________________
Clive Boustred, Sui Juris
210 Suncrest Dr.
Soquel, CA 95073
+1 (408) 889-4351
County of Santa Cruz ]
State of California ]
I, Clive Boustred, being the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:
That the afore-going Document(s), Affidavit(s), Declaration(s), and/or Materials, Id., including referenced and/or attached documents, and/or duplicates of such documents are exacting copies of the originals in my/or my counsel’s (specifically not American Bar Association, or professional “Attorney’s”) possession. That I have read the foregoing document(s) and attachments, and know and understand their contents, and having personal knowledge, know them to be true. As to those matters submitted therein upon information and/or belief, as to those matters, I also believe them true.
Executed this tenth day of March, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior Jesus the Christ Two-Thousand-Three.
Clive Boustred – AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
A Free Man, Sovereign, Constitutional Rights Intact
Santa Cruz Judicial District
210 Suncrest Dr.
Subscribed this 10th day of March, under exigent circumstances, before Almighty God, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, Two-Thousand-Three.
Clive Boustred – AT LAW
In Propria Persona, Sui Juris
A Free Man, Sovereign, Constitutional Rights Intact
Reserving All Rights, Giving Up None
The Superior Court, State of California, in and for the County of Santa Cruz
Clive Boustred, ]
] Case No. FL
Appellant/Petitioner ] CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE/
vs. ] AFFIDAVIT OF
] PROOF OF SERVICE
ANAMARIA BOUSTRED ]
_______________________________________________] [CCP § 1013 and § 2015.5]
I, the undersigned hereby certify and declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within entitled cause of action; and, Further, hereby deposes and says: that on the date signed below, I did serve UNDER AUTHORITY OF APPELLANT/PETITIONER the attached document named:
1.) VERIFIED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT 31 Pages
The aforesaid documents were served in the following manner:
____By personal service IN COURT. I did personally deliver the above-described documents at the address, or addresses captioned below:
____By the U.S. Postal Service having knowledge of the United States Mail Post
paid certified envelope, sealed by my hand at _______________________.
Certified Number __________________________________
____By phone communication transmission [FAX], the material aforementioned on-line was sent at a total of ______ transmitted pages to Tel.#( ) -
____By sealed envelope, hand enclosed by me and mailed to:
Further, I declare under penalty of perjury knowing the laws thereof within the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that these documents were served by me personally as stated above and/or mailed and sealed as stated above within the California Republic.
DATED: March 10th, 2002 ______________________________________
______AM/PM Name: -By Lawful Service
City/State: Soquel, California 
 The Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Cruz shall be concurrent with and equivalent to the Santa Cruz County court in Term as created in the Constitution for the state of California 1849 at Article VI, section I with its full Judicial Powers, not the inferior Legislative powers courts of the United States Amendment Fourteen due process.
 “The rights of advocacy and to petition the government for redress of grievances are protected by the First Amendment.” NAACP v. Button, 37 U.S. 415, 429; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235.
 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
As amended to December 1, 2002
II. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS
Rule 3. The Complaint
The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It must be made under oath before a magistrate judge or, if none is reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer.
(As amended Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002.)
 See published California Civil Code, § 22.2.
"The Constitution is to be interpreted according to Common Law Rules." Schick vs. U.S., 195 US 65, 24 Sup. Ct. 826, 49 L. Ed. 99
 All Public statutes of California must prevail over any code which it contravenes or is inconsistent with. See text of the original Political Code at Sections 4479, and 4494.
See also: "A statute should be construed in harmony with the Common Law unless there is a clear legislative intent to abrogate the Common Law." --United Bank vs. Mesa Nelson Co., 121 Ariz 438, 590 P2d 1384, 25 U.C.C.RS 1113
 The philosophy of all these cases is based upon the early rule of In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380 [62 P. 613], that the right of a parent to the use of a minor child is a right of property of which a parent cannot be deprived unless the court finds that he or she is "unfit." Booth v. Booth, 69 Cal. App. 2d 496, 159 P.2d 93 (Cal.App.Dist.1 06/08/1945)
 Father cannot alienate his right to the Custody and control of his child. People ex rel Barry v. Mercien 3 Hill 399
 If right to counsel is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to mercies of incompetent counsel, and judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts. McMann v. Richardson 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (U.S.N.Y. 1970)
 Pro se litigant's pleadings should not be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. "Significantly, the Haines case involved a pro se complaint - as does the present case - which requires a less stringent reading than one drafted by a lawyer. Puckett v. Cox 456 F.2d 233, at 236 (1972)
 “Feme sole or Feme-sole. A single woman; one who has never been married, who has been judicially separated from her husband, or whose marriage has been dissolved by divorce from, or by the death of, the husband. A married woman who, in matters of property, is independent of her husband, is a feme sole as to such property, and may deal with it as if she were unmarried.” Taylor v. Meads, 34 L.J. Ch. 207 (1865).
 Officer jointly liable with mother for abducting son from father. Shields
v. Martin, 706 P.2d 21 (Idaho 1985)
 "The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952)
 SEE: TITLE 28 , PART V, CHAPTER 115, Sec. 1738B.
§ 1738B. Full faith and credit for child support orders
 182. (a) If two or more persons conspire:
(1) To commit any crime.
(2) Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to
procure another to be charged or arrested for any crime.
(3) Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action, or proceeding.
(4) To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means
which are in themselves criminal, or to obtain money or property by
false pretenses or by false promises with fraudulent intent not to
perform those promises.
 The Statute makes no such distinction (California Penal Code §§ 806, 813). Naturally, if the complaint justifies a warrant and preliminary hearing, and a subsequent binding over for trial, one skilled in the art should draw all indictments and informations. This would be the district attorney. Calif.Gov.Code § 26502.
 Board of Trustees v. Municipal Court, 95 Cal.App.3d 322, the court wrote:
"It is only when a complaint with supporting affidavit is filed can the municipal court be required to assume jurisdiction."
 "'As between parents adversely claiming the custody, neither parent is entitled to it as of right; but other things being equal, if the child is of tender years, it should be given to the mother; if it is of an age to require education and preparation for labor and business, then to the father.'
"This section does not give the mother the absolute right to the custody of a child of tender years. The qualifying clause, 'but other things being equal,' still leaves a large measure of discretion with the trial court. If the court finds that other things are not equal, as it evidently did here, and there is any substantial evidence to support such a finding, our inquiry is at an end." SEE: Bush v. Bush, 81 Cal. App. 2d 695, 185 P.2d 38 (Cal.App.Dist.4 10/06/1947) Please note, because of said orders finality under law, contemnors are attempting to circumvent the courts sage findings under said order (See Page 2 thereon: Item 3: “The children shall share time with their parents according to the following schedule: A. Mother shall be responsible for the children Monday through Friday from 9:00AM until 6:00PM. If no school then return time is 3:00PM. B. The parents shall alternate Saturday and Sunday each weekend, one parent shall be responsible from Friday evening until Saturday evening and the other parent from Saturday evening until Sunday evening. C. Father shall be responsible for the children all other unspecified time(s). [Father’s custodial percentage works out to 60% majority custody].”
 The Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Cruz shall be concurrent with and equivalent to the Santa Cruz County court in Term as created in the Constitution for the state of California 1849 at Article VI, section I with its full Judicial Powers, not the inferior Legislative powers courts of the United States Amendment Fourteen due process.
 The Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Santa Cruz shall be concurrent with and equivalent to the County of Alameda court in Term as created in the Constitution for the state of California 1849 at Article Vi, section I with its full Judicial Powers, not the inferior Legislative powers courts of the United States Amendment Fourteen due process.